To compare it to the 2018 defense strategy from Trump’s first term, where the main priority was the competition between the great powers and how to win this competition. Now, there is much more focus on the idea of ​​defending the US and the Western Hemisphere and on this idea of ​​”America First.” And, strangely enough, there is absolutely no discussion at all about artificial intelligence in defense, although in the last three strategies there was always an emphasis on these new weapons or drones driven by artificial intelligence. Everyone expected that there would be more investment opportunities precisely on the idea of ​​AI in weapons, as always happened in the last strategies when they were launched.

The most interesting thing is that now the four priorities of the Americans have been given in order. In the last strategies, there were always several priorities placed on the same level. Biden, for example, had China as his main priority—how to fight China, how to ensure that it does not overtake the US—and the rest were put on many other conflict zones, many other important regions, on about the same level of importance. But now a very clear hierarchy has been made, and only four main priorities have been mentioned:

The first is to defend the US and the regions in the US area—all those territories over which the US wants influence. In second place is the idea of ​​taking care of China, of trying to deter an attack from China, but now through strength, not through force—a very important nuance. In third place, increasing “burden sharing” with US allies, meaning, in Romanian, that Europeans should take more care of their own security and that it should no longer be the US’s responsibility to finance the defense of its allies. In fourth place they used a term of “supercharging,” meaning to revive the American military-industrial complex on a maximum scale.

To put it in order, it is clear what is being discussed when we talk about US defense. Just as we returned to protectionism in economics, here we return to this concept of Trump’s “America “First”—but not just America. First, the entire Western Hemisphere—also talking about Greenland, the Panama Canal, and the Gulf of Mexico—are very important areas of control for the US, where it should no longer accept foreign influence.

Regarding China, it is interesting that Taiwan or a possible conflict there is no longer mentioned at all. It is no longer a process of escalating the conflict, of getting as close as possible to war—because this has been the process so far: the Americans would send some soldiers somewhere, the Chinese would send some ships somewhere, and, in the end, it would end up in a war.

That was Biden’s strategy, if we take it de facto. Now it’s just about peace, about how we can avoid any confrontation with China, and about how we can continue to have respectful relations with China. And there’s even talk of communication between American forces and Chinese military forces. It’s no longer about China as a competitor to the US. China is only called the second most powerful country in the world.

Then, if we look at Europe, here it’s very clear: there’s talk of NATO having to rely more on the Europeans, that it’s not the Americans’ responsibility, as long as the Europeans don’t spend enough, as a percentage of GDP, on defense. The 5% GDP target for defense forces is still there. And Russia is seen as a continuing threat to Eastern Europe, but a threat that the Europeans can deal with independently.

And finally, as we would expect from the businessman Trump, more investment and expansion from the military-industrial complex is demanded. Clearly, many companies will come to invest even more, not only for their own influence but also to get on well with Trump—as we have become accustomed to by now.

By Daria Gusa

www.solidnews.ro