For years, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have been seen as the Gulf’s strategic binomial: two conservative, coordinated, anti-revolutionary regimes, lovers of multipolarity and new technologies, aligned in the effort to counter political Islamism and determined to prevent a repeat of the wave of protest of 2011, known as the Arab Spring. The 2016 moment – ​​the famous desert trip of the two princes – was seen as the beginning of an “alignment” between the region’s most ambitious leaders, with a common project of stabilising the Arab world and an MBS in the role of MBZ’s apprentice. However, over time, a structural difference emerged between the two power models, culminating in a statement by MBS in 2022: “I will do more harm to the Emiratis than I did to the Qataris,” referring to the land, air, and sea embargo imposed on Qatar in 2017.

The Saudi model of foreign policy remains essentially state-centric, focused on sovereignty, territorial integrity, formal diplomatic instruments, and a tendency to try to end conflicts in the region through agreements that restore a traditional, albeit imperfect, state order. Saudi Arabia can be pragmatic, tough, or transactional, but it projects its legitimacy as a great power, a guarantor of the regional architecture. In contrast, the Emirati model is often described as network-centric: a power exercised through nodes, corridors, ports, financial networks, geopolitically relevant private investments, and commercial interdependencies.

Aware of the small size of their state, the Emiratis do not aim for total control of other states, but only for key segments, through win-win deals and informal military support, in a model close to the Chinese OBOR or the Russian Wagner. It is a form of modern power, built on individual levers of control, especially effective in states with weak central authority. These two logics can coexist for a while but eventually collide, each generating a different regional order: the Saudis aspire to classical hegemony in the Middle East, while the UAE is content with an informal, unofficially recognised dominance.

Yemen has been the testing ground for this rift. The anti-Houthi coalition began as a joint Saudi-Emirati effort, but over time priorities diverged: Riyadh focused on securing the southern flank and maintaining Yemen as a state, while Abu Dhabi pursued control of ports and infrastructure, funding local actors who could guarantee access to strategic hubs. The UAE’s withdrawal from Yemen earlier this year was a small victory for the Saudis, but it was followed by the withdrawal of Emirati companies from Riyadh’s grand futuristic projects.

The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea have become natural extensions of the dispute, providing ports, military bases, and access to vital trade routes. Saudi Arabia seeks to bring the region back into the logic of the state and formal alliances, while the Emirates prefers flexible partnerships with sub-state actors in order to obtain port concessions and a dual-use logistics presence – commercial and military. Both states have invested heavily, directly or indirectly, in relationships with rival governments, local elites, and security arrangements that go beyond traditional military cooperation. This competition for control of maritime chokepoints is transforming East Africa into an extension of the Gulf power architecture. The war in Sudan is the most violent front of this type of competition, considered the worst humanitarian catastrophe of the modern era by most NGOs.

The UAE supports the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), with the tacit consent of the US, while Saudi Arabia supports the Sudanese government alongside Egypt, Turkey and Russia. This war will either result in a fractured Sudan, composed of controllable enclaves, or a unified but fragile Sudan. The outcome will determine not only the security of the Red Sea and sea lanes but also who will benefit from Sudan’s significant resources.

Libya is perhaps the oldest and clearest example of how the Gulf hegemony competition has extended to North Africa, even as MBS and MBZ formally sit on the same side of the conflict. For over a decade, the fragmented Libyan state has become a breeding ground for outside influence. For the UAE, Libya has been an ideal laboratory for testing its model of indirect power: support for local actors like Haftar’s forces, able to control territory, energy infrastructure, and smuggling routes outside the internationally recognised government framework. Saudi Arabia has not treated Libya as a strategic priority comparable to Yemen, but as the Emirates has strengthened ties with local powers in eastern Libya, the Libyan issue has been reframed in Riyadh within the logic of Gulf rivalry, and the Saudis have sought to take over Haftar’s support.

Control of parts of the Mediterranean coast, energy routes and links to the Sahel offers a strategic advantage that goes beyond the strictly Libyan stakes: access to nodes of influence in North Africa, with projection towards Europe and energy corridors. Thus, Libya becomes part of the same equation as Yemen – a space of confrontation between two contrasting geopolitical visions, this time both supporting the same local actor alongside Moscow and Cairo, with the same goal of controlling the adjacent strategic benefits.

Algeria is now also entering the scene as a symptom of the expansion of this rivalry. On February 7, 2026, Algeria initiated the procedure to terminate the air services agreement with the Emirates, signed in 2013, in the context of accusations in the local press of interference and attempts at destabilisation. In the same vein, speculation and reports have emerged about possible broader diplomatic tensions between Algiers and Abu Dhabi, including accusations of support for separatist groups. And the list can go on with examples from Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, DRC, Morocco or Nigeria. Africa is therefore not only the richest continent in resources but also one where Western powers have been dethroned in the competition for influence not only by Russia, China and India but also by the Gulf States. Currently, the United Arab Emirates seems to be winning the race for Africa, having been declared the fourth largest investor on the continent in recent years.

Interestingly, this competition between the two powers does not fit into the classic “pro-Western vs. anti-Western” scheme, as in other regions. Both Saudi Arabia and the Emirates actively play into the multipolar logic, maintaining close relations with Washington, Moscow, and Beijing, all three powers juggling between MBS and MBZ. In the last few weeks alone, we have seen MBZ in Moscow, in dialogue with Putin regarding the peace negotiations in Abu Dhabi, while MBS was meeting with Erdogan and sending a delegation to Washington. It would not be surprising if, soon, MBS arrives in Moscow and MBZ in Washington. And both leaders are criticised for their excessive proximity to Israel: MBS has long been suspected of collaborating with Mossad, limited mainly by the risk of a popular uprising in a Saudi Arabia that is difficult to “buy”, unlike the small and controllable population of the UAE. At the same time, Abu Dhabi is constantly accused in the Saudi press of Zionism and subordination to Israel, with Riyadh frequently recalling the Abraham Accords and the military, economic and intelligence collaboration between the Emirates and Israel in Yemen, Eritrea and Somalia.

Similarly, when it comes to Iran, Abu Dhabi “forgets” about its proximity to Israel and clandestinely allows Iranian businessmen and institutions to use its financial infrastructure to avoid sanctions, while Riyadh officially resumed relations with Tehran starting in 2023.

Therefore, the friction between the two powers does not come from ideological differences but from the similarity of geopolitical ambitions: both aim to define the regional order, control economic nodes and secure strategic routes by integrating into the new multipolar order as regional leaders. The competition between them is systemic, and the result will define the model of effective diplomacy in the 21st century.

By Daria Gusa