During the celebrations of the Taiwan holiday, President Tsai Ing-wen gave a speech in which several observers glimpsed an “olive branch” towards Beijing. Referring to the speech at the United Nations in which Xi Jinping argued that China will never seek to be a hegemonic power or the creation of “spheres of influence”, Tsai spoke of a “first step”, hoping for a change of approach to the intricate dialogue. by the CCP. The problem is that dialogue remains impossible because the starting conditions are irreconcilable. The Democratic Progressive Party calls for a relationship between “equals”, therefore with the recognition of an otherness that Beijing does not want to recognize. Indeed, the CCP demands acceptance of the “1992 consensus” and the one China principle as a precondition. Consent that Tsai has always rejected

In recent weeks, the tension is evident, various more or less expected sources claim that the chances of a war are clearly increasing. Xi’s inspection of the marines that preceded his speech in Shenzhen seems to support this thesis, with an invitation to the soldiers to “get ready” to fight. However, the fundamental rhetorical aspect must be considered. Beijing cannot afford to be weak on Taiwan on three fronts: the domestic one, the Taiwanese one and the American one.

In fact, in recent months, the United States has brought Taipei increasingly into the spotlight and on various issues: the possible trade agreement, the visits of the Undersecretary of State and the Secretary of Health (diplomatically highest missions in the last 35 years on the ‘island), the ban on exports of semiconductors (a sector in which Taiwanese Tsmc is the world leader), the new arms sale for seven billion dollars. Spotlight under which Taipei is uncomfortable, also because Trump’s unpredictability risks creating permanent damage to a status quo that, after all, did not mind on either side of the Strait.

The feeling is that we still remain on a rhetorical dimension, in which the CCP tries to put the DPP in difficulty from the outside and the Guomindang (the Chinese nationalist party in opposition to Formosa) tries to do the same on the inside, as it demonstrates the (in some ways paradoxical) request to the government to work towards establishing official diplomatic relations with Washington. On the one hand, Beijing tries to tell the Taiwanese that Tsai is unable to keep them safe, on the other hand the GMD tries to convince them that it is not convinced enough to go through with its diplomatic detachment from mainland China.

What increases, however, is the risk of accidents, with increasingly frequent military tests and air crossings. Not to mention the mutual accusations of espionage, with a former Taiwanese colonel sentenced to four years on charges of sharing military secrets and the Global Times campaign which is devoting a great deal of space to the story of the Taiwanese “hundreds of spies”. Meanwhile, Taiwan closes after island authorities asked the company to register as “Chinese”.
In Taipei they are probably looking forward to the American elections, so as not to really risk becoming that “October surprise” that could expose the island to great risks.

By Domenico Greco