Balochistan holds significant strategic and economic importance for both China and Pakistan, under the leadership of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif (2024-incumbent). The region’s strategic role is, domestically and internationally, a top priority on Islamabad’s agenda, which is committed to stemming growing instability and stifling the independence drives of the Baloch separatist movement. Although, during one of the bilateral meetings with the Chinese counterpart, Nawaz Sharif stressed that CPEC would benefit all Pakistani provinces, some members of the Baloch population do not share this view, seeing few tangible benefits from these large-scale projects.

Where, then, can the point of contention be identified? Chinese investments aimed at infrastructural development in the region are causing tensions with the Baloch population, who express concerns about resource exploitation and perceive these initiatives as possible interference with their identity ambitions and socioeconomic marginalization. Indeed, what differentiates Balochistan is the unique and complex combination of natural wealth and socioeconomic challenges that the local population faces.

The Baloch concern about the benefits to the autochthonous population is mainly related to the fact that the labor force employed in CPEC projects includes a significant Chinese presence, contributing to the debate with the central government about the region’s economic benefits. From a practical point of view, this situation has led to local tensions, manifested in numerous attacks conducted by the separatist armed group, the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA).

The most recent incident, in August 2024,  known as Operation Herof or Dark Windy Storm, was one in a series of attacks linked to tensions in the region. On this occasion, suicide squad members of the Majeed Brigade, using tactics such as vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) and infiltration, attacked targets related to the Islamabad-Beijing shared project, causing damage to highway and railway lines and police stations. These events are placed in the context of some Baloch groups’ historic claims to autonomy, along with their desire to safeguard their territory by eradicating Chinese and Pakistani presence from the region. Reaction from China and Pakistan was immediate, strongly condemning the attacks carried out by the BLA, which was responsible for targeting Chinese officials and CPEC-related infrastructure.

The balance — or, it could be better said, imbalance — in the Balochistan region both generates internal tensions with domestic repercussions and brings significant implications for the broader international context. First, the success of the BRI depends in part on the stability of the CPEC. This means that it is Pakistan’s direct prerogative to implement coordination of efforts to ensure an internal security environment, which is vital to convey confidence to the Chinese leadership. With such a perspective, if attacks on Chinese infrastructure and personnel are not contained, the stability of the Sino-Pakistani partnership could be jeopardized, with severe consequences for both Beijing and Islamabad.

If, on the one hand, China were to lose Gwadar, a strategic access point to global trade routes, on the other hand, Pakistan would lose its role as a regional hub and emerge economically weakened. Although the scenario described could occur, it is unlikely to happen in the short term. Cooperation with Pakistan is crucial, especially in a period of increasingly fragmented world order and China’s efforts to increase its influence. China, therefore, cannot afford to lose access to the Indian Ocean, especially given the fragility of the Malacca Strait and the rising tensions in the South China Sea, particularly with Vietnam and the Philippines.

At the same time, Beijing and Islamabad’s pursuit of a top-down approach could exacerbate the already tense national climate, causing a total imbalance in the region. This scenario could benefit India, which Sharif’s Pakistani government has already accused of offering support to the Baloch people in an anti-Chinese and anti-Pakistani manner. Indeed, CPEC is crucial in the political agenda of the Narendra Modi-led republic because India views the project as part of a broader Chinese strategy to increase its influence in the Indian Ocean, which is perceived as potentially undermining India’s regional interests.

Iran and Afghanistan are two other powers to consider, as they share part of their borders with Pakistan’s Balochistan province. The escalation of tensions in Pakistani territory is being watched and given great attention by Tehran. The Iranian government fears that insurgencies by the Baloch in Pakistan could have negative consequences in Iran’s Sistan and Balochistan province, putting the country’s internal security at risk. From the Afghan perspective, the situation is different but equally delicate. The implications are related to possible diplomatic tensions with the government of Pakistan caused by the alleged shelter offered on Afghan soil to the Balochistan groups. It is about a circumstance that could repeat and further sour the relationship between Kabul and Islamabad.

Pakistan, China, India, Iran, and Afghanistan, though so different, find common ground of interests in the geopolitical dynamics of the Baloch people’s insurgencies. Taking into consideration a possible escalation of the crisis in the region, there could be a number of regional actors coming into the arena driven by different agendas. Such instability establishes a sensitive dynamic among regional powers, as they often compete to exert influence on the political and security situation in the region. A potential scenario of interconnected conflicts characterized by balancing games, destabilization, possible gains and inevitable drawbacks is what the region is dealing with. As such, the Balochistan region emerges as a complex and delicate geopolitical node, able to move the threads of possible future alliances and clashes.

By Azzurra Bassetti