Trump, Putin, Xi – Who will be Europe’s saviour?

Elon Musk’s post on X last week asked to “Make Europe Great Again.” In these four words, he managed to encapsulate the urgent needs of Europe, which has transformed from the world’s most powerful civilization into an open-air museum where billionaires from other continents spend their vacations and a scapegoat used by great powers in their real power games. Mario Draghi’s report from the end of last year revealed to the general public that Europe is in a process of steady decline, caused by its dependence on the U.S., which surpasses the EU in all the categories where Europe should excel (technology, industry, armament, etc.). Many economic analysts see Europe as becoming a new Japan, referring, of course, to the incredible success Japan’s economy had last century—a success quickly undermined by its American ally when competition became a real issue. When it comes to industry, Europe is not only behind China or the U.S., but it can no longer even compete with them. The population is aging rapidly, the economy can no longer be sustained without immigrants from other continents, and prices are rising ever higher due to the perpetual wars ordered by a Washington panicked by its own decline, which has long infiltrated its forces into all European capitals.

But despite the problems of the last decade, Europe can still be saved. It is clear that Europe needs a reset in its relationship with the U.S. or a geopolitical recalibration, but which alliance would be the most beneficial?

Currently, the European population is divided between those who desire full sovereignty and those who, for personal profit, wish to maintain the status quo, in which Americans completely control European politics. Unfortunately, I don’t believe sovereignty alone would suffice in this new multipolar world, given the serious problems facing the continent. Europe will have to align with the most advantageous bloc and receive support from a major power to return to the center of the international competition for resources and influence.

John Mearsheimer, the well-known realist geopolitician, suggests that the coming decades will be dominated by “great power politics”: the U.S., China, and Russia – with Europe omitted in favor of Russia. It is evident that Europe needs Trump, Putin, or Xi to halt its decline. But which of these leaders would still be willing to save us?

Donald Trump

Although many had high hopes for Donald Trump as the savior of US allies, Europeans should not be overly enthusiastic about his tenure. In November, the European Council on Foreign Relations asked 28,000 people worldwide whether Trump’s election was good for their country. While 85% of Indians and 59% of Russians responded positively, only 22% of EU citizens gave a favorable response—less than the Chinese (46%) or Ukrainians (26%).

These answers are not surprising. American imperialism is what led to Europe’s decline, replacing European colonialism and transforming Europe into a neo-colony of Washington. In recent weeks, Trump demonstrated his own imperialism through threats to annex Canada, America’s closest ally, Greenland, the Panama Canal… American allies have become subordinates, and their destruction has become a mere tool for the American empire. Let us recall that just two weeks after the war in Ukraine began, President Biden publicly stated, standing beside the German Chancellor, that he would destroy Nord Stream if Russia continued its invasion, without considering the consequences for Europe.

As a businessman, and given the enormous debts of the U.S., Trump has already declared that he will impose a 10% tariff on products from around the world, including European goods, practically destroying Europe’s export economy, whose largest partner is America. Furthermore, Trump announced that he would begin exploiting more natural resources in the U.S., which he would sell to Europe at much higher prices than Russian resources—resources to be bought with money Europe doesn’t have and would borrow from international institutions controlled by the U.S., such as the IMF.

Even more important than economic influence is military influence. Since the end of World War II, the U.S. has been the guarantor of Europe’s security. Although initially, the U.S. did not want this role, attempting to bring American forces back home to reduce its defense budget, the Cold War convinced it of Europe’s utility. Since then, the U.S. has intentionally tried to maintain its privileged position on the continent. While the U.S. has consistently tried to convince European nations to spend more on defense, it has firmly opposed independent EU initiatives for collective defense. However, while Europe’s military dependence on the U.S. was a deliberate policy of Washington, many American leaders (including Trump) have grown increasingly frustrated with the perceived lack of contribution from Europe. This dependence, normalized but completely abnormal from a historical perspective given Europe’s larger population and geographical distance from the U.S., influences both the foreign and domestic policies of the EU.

Defending Europe represents a significant cost for the U.S., but it is a necessity for us. Let us not forget that without the presence of the U.S. and Turkey in NATO, Europe’s military forces cannot compare to the other major armies of the world. Furthermore, U.S. attention on our continent has significantly declined over the past decade, given the pivot to Asia initiated by Obama and consolidated by Trump, which focuses American foreign policy on competition with China. When a businessman is in charge, and his country has massive debts, it is logical to expect that defense resources will be redirected to strategic regions like Asia. As U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance said, Europe must “stand on its own feet.” U.S. military resources are currently tied up, not only in hundreds of bases worldwide but especially in Ukraine, and the threat of the Thucydides trap grows daily.

The only significant drawback for the Trump administration when considering a total withdrawal from Europe is the reduction in American arms sales to European states, as EU nations would seek to produce their own weapons. This is precisely why it is in the U.S.’s interest to keep Europe militarily and financially weakened, dependent on American exports but incapable of real industrial competition: the U.S. can maintain its charade of partnership with the EU while focusing its resources on China, retaining control over European politics. Unfortunately, Trump’s plan is not in Europe’s interest.

Vladimir Putin

When asked about Europe’s grim prospects during the annual Valdai Discussion Club conference in Moscow last December, Vladimir Putin recounted a 1993 conversation between the mayor of St. Petersburg and Helmut Kohl, the then-German chancellor, which profoundly influenced his thinking about Europe. Kohl reportedly told him that the future of Europe—if the continent wishes to remain independent—can only be alongside Russia because Americans will always see Europe as a subordinate. Putin added that he agrees with this idea and is willing to collaborate with Europe to build a Eurasian security system that would benefit both Russia and Europe.

Although the EU significantly surpasses Russia in terms of GDP (which is ten times higher) or military expenditures (three times higher), Mearsheimer nonetheless identifies Russia as one of the three main actors on the global stage. This perception likely stems from Europe’s lack of unity, particularly in military matters—a situation orchestrated by the U.S.—and its dependence on Washington for foreign policy, leading to a fragmented approach.

Russia’s abundance of cheap natural resources—essential for the reconstruction of European industry—and its advanced military technology at affordable prices, combined with cultural and geographical affinities between Europe and Russia, make Russia a far more natural ally than the US. Russia is the largest European player: 16% of Europe’s population consists of Russians, and cooperation with Russia is essential for an independent pan-European security architecture, regardless of our perceptions of its political decisions. And just as Europe has historically influenced Russia, Russia has been shaped by its interactions with Europe, a fact we cannot avoid: in the 19th century, the primary intellectual debate in Russia was between Slavophiles and Westernizers, divided over the essence of Russian civilization and its relationship with Europe.

Culturally, rapprochement with Russia would appeal to the Christian and conservative community in Europe, which has become more vocal in recent years. In Russian intellectual circles, the idea of designating Russia as the “Third Rome” already exists. This is a reinterpretation of a 16th-century Christian prophecy that claims Moscow is the third and final Christian kingdom, destined to fight against the Antichrist, represented by progressivism and overly liberal values, and to save the ancient European civilizations.

Furthermore, Russia is the only major actor on the international stage that has shown any sign of wanting to save Europe from a marginal subordinate role. Neither Europe nor Russia can fully replace each other with other partnerships. Although Russia has a solid partnership with China and other BRICS countries, the sanctions imposed by the West limit the potential of these relationships. Moreover, Europe represented 70% of Russia’s gas exports, a significant component of Russia’s GDP. Cooperation between the two regions remains economically essential for the future of both parties, at least in the medium term.

Xi Jinping

The Chinese adore Europe’s museums, castles, and beaches, but they have never been particularly attached to our continent. The distance, the cultural discrepancies, and European colonialism have led China to view Europe as its least likely ally. Recent EU actions against China—such as the extremely high tariffs imposed on Chinese imports and the official designation of China as simultaneously a partner, a systemic rival, and an economic threat—underscore this sentiment. Although many of these hostile actions are driven by Europe’s relationship with the U.S., which sees China as the main threat of the 21st century, European representatives are equally frightened by China’s incredible economic success compared to their own decline.

At the same time, Europe’s weakened position as an exporter of Western values means that, while the U.S. is a natural enemy of China, Europe can act more pragmatically, seeking mutual benefits in its relationship with China. Xi Jinping’s visits to France, Serbia, and Hungary last year proved China’s willingness to cooperate with Europe, as well as Xi’s desire to have the European market open for Chinese companies and to expand the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, China shows no signs of wanting to replace the U.S. as the region’s protector—a role that would require considerable resources, which could instead be invested in closer countries that can guarantee loyalty to China. Additionally, Europe’s future relations with Asia must also consider Russia’s position. The development of the BRI in Europe would be extremely beneficial for Europeans, but the New Silk Road’s route passes through Russia and its sphere of influence. Any involvement in this project cannot proceed without prior agreement and cooperation with Russia.

In an objective geopolitical analysis, the advantages of each alliance must be considered, as well as the desires and needs of potential allies regarding their own regions. In the case of the U.S., although Europe now desperately needs renewed support and investment from the country it tied its fate to, Europe’s utility to the Americans is seen as nearing its end. Beyond perpetuating European dependence, Trump’s America feels no need for a strong Europe, preferring to distance itself economically and militarily from the EU—something easily done given the geographical distance.

In the case of Russia, geography dictates inevitable cooperation, and the statements of Russian representatives hint at a mutually beneficial collaboration that both parties would logically find appealing. Considering economic imperatives and the desire for sovereignty among European nations, once the conflict in Ukraine ends—which I predict will happen this year—Europe and Russia could naturally grow closer again.

When it comes to China, geographical distance and cultural disparities significantly influence the possibility of a serious alliance between the two entities. Furthermore, China focuses on leading the group of emerging economies, where it can reap considerable benefits from its investments without major obstacles from the other two great powers, and the EU’s demonization of China rules out the possibility of a significant agreement in the next decade.

While the obvious conclusion is that Russia would be the most viable ally for the EU in these challenging times, it is equally evident that the bureaucrats in Brussels will not be the ones to willingly distance themselves from the U.S. The responsibility for such a shift lies in the hands of EU member states’ leaders, and the decision will have to be made this year, while Europe still has time to change its trajectory.

By Daria Gusa