This new round of conflict has a historical root that could be traced to the historical leftovers from the colonial period. The Belgian colonizers artificially distinguished ethnics in Rwanda and the now called DRC, creating tensions between Hutus and Tutsis, which culminated in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. After the massacre, a large number of Hutu extremists fled to eastern Congo and formed the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (DFLR), which was considered as a threat of Rwanda. Correspondingly, Rwandans supported Tutsi armed groups in eastern DRC, including the M23 Movement, in the name of “fighting the massacre forces”. M23, also known as the Congolese Revolutionary Army, was formed in 2012, mainly comprised of soldiers in the DRC army that were not satisfied with the DRC government. The name of M23 originates from a peace agreement signed on 23 March 2009, aiming at reconciliation between different ethnicities and protecting the Tutsi’s minorities. However, M23 claimed that the Congolese government had failed to deliver on its promises as the Tutsis were not well-protected from the attacks of other armed forces such as DFLR. Though officially denied, the reports from the United Nations indicated that Rwandan government had provided support to M23, by providing weapons, trainings, as well as directly engaging their operations. Experts estimated that Rwanda has deployed between 4000 to 7000 troops to assist M23 in the eastern DRC, a figure roughly equal to or even larger than the rebel group’s own forces.

Rwanda’s intervention to the eastern DRC is far more complex than “hunting the massacre forces”, but perhaps an ambitious economic intuition to control this region. The eastern DRC is extremely rich in mineral resources, including gold, coltan (used in electronics), and cassiterite. DRC’s cobalt production accounted for 68% of the world in 2022 before the conflict began, and most of its cobalt mines distributed in the North Kivu and South Kivu provinces (which were in the east). DRC holds 50%-80% of the world’s tantalum reserves, and simply the North Kivu province itself has provided more than 70% of the world’s tantalum supply. Tantalum is used to make capacitors in electronic components and is a key material in the smartphone, automotive electronics, and aerospace industries. The rich resource endowment made the eastern DRC a target. According to the report provided to the UN security council by its experts panel, M23 had occupied the largest coltan mine in the region, and smuggled at least 150 tons of coltan into Rwanda, earning at least $300,000 a month. Interestingly, based on National Bank of Rwanda’s annual report, the gold export accounted for 34% of its export in 2023, while Rwanda actually does not have any gold mines. It makes people becoming more and more suspicious about Rwanda’s role in the eastern DRC’s rebellion. The gains from controlling the minerals also supported M23’s military expenditures, making the rebellion force even more powerful compared to the government troops.

Unless one is an expert or native to the region, it might be difficult to grasp the scale difference between the two countries. Counterintuitively, the DRC is approximately 90 times larger than Rwanda in terms of land area, and its population is around eight times greater. Despite DRC holds absolute advantages in terms of size, the government forces continuously to lose control of its eastern territories, due to many reasons. Its opponent, Rwanda, experienced steady but rapid development since the 1994 massacre. Kagame’s successful presidency helped the government to out of the shadow of corruption. The government spent more than 10% of its expenditures on infrastructure constructions each year, which improved the economic connections across the country. It also promoted mass education and health services across the country, which significantly increased the literacy and the average life expectancy. Between 2005 and 2013, life expectancy increased from 55.2 to 64.0, under-5 mortality decreased from 106.4 to 52.0 per 1,000 live births, and incidence of tuberculosis has dropped from 101 to 69 per 100,000 people. As a result of these measures, Rwanda’s real GDP increased by 9.7% in the first half of 2024, while the number for DRC wad 4.7%, which could not be considered decent for an underdeveloped economy.

Those programs not only require strong executive force, but also capitals. The international aids are an important source of the funds. The World Bank has invested $9 billion in infrastructure and education in Rwanda. International Aid has been around $1 billion on average each year, accounting for 8-10% of its gross national income (GNI), significantly higher than the average of its East African neighbors.

Besides its relatively effective governance and low corruption compared to other lower-middle income economy, the country’s ability to attract such tremendous number of capitals is also closely tied with its image to the world. Following the tragedy of the Rwandan Genocide, the country became widely regarded as a victim by the international community. In the subsequent reconstruction, Rwanda portrayed itself as a country that had reborn from tragedy. Coupled with its relatively stable and safe environment in Africa, Rwanda successfully attracted significant international aid and investment. However, the tragic memory had somehow become a justification for certain expansionary actions, without being judged by the international community. Supporting M23 was a vivid example, as Rwanda claimed its need to eliminate the genocide forces. It shielded Rwanda from international awareness and condemnations.

The lives of Africans are as important as Ukrainians or Palestinians. No matter helpful or not, the international community need to focus more on this corner of the world.

By Xingchen Liu