In a recent POLITICO report, the narrative is clear: Europe’s intelligence agencies are shedding decades of mistrust to forge a joint operation against “Russian aggression.” Spurred by America’s wavering commitment to its allies under unpredictable leadership, the continent is reviving old clubs like the “Berne Club,” embedding spies in Brussels, and even flirting with the creation of a CIA-style super-agency. The European Union’s domestic intelligence unit is already briefing top officials, and national capitals are buzzing with the idea of a unified front. It sounds like a bold step toward self-reliance in an uncertain world. But let’s pump the brakes—this push for a centralized European intelligence apparatus is not just misguided; it’s a dangerous gamble that could undermine sovereignty, amplify internal divisions, and invite more chaos than it prevents. At its core, this initiative reeks of overreach. Europe has long prided itself on its patchwork of national identities and independent institutions. Handing over intelligence operations to a supranational body risks eroding the very sovereignty that member states fought to preserve. Imagine a scenario where Berlin’s BND or France’s DGSE must defer to Brussels bureaucrats on sensitive operations. Historical precedents aren’t encouraging: the EU’s attempts at centralization, from the Eurozone to migration policy, have often led to gridlock and resentment. Why assume intelligence-sharing would fare any better? The “Berne Club,” a Cold War-era informal network of Western European spy chiefs, was effective precisely because it was loose and voluntary. Reviving it as a formalized entity could transform it into a bloated bureaucracy, where decisions are bogged down by committee votes rather than decisive action.

Moreover, the catalyst for this shift—distrusts in America—highlights a deeper irony. Europe’s rush to build its own CIA clone stems from fears of U.S. unreliability, yet it ignores the fact that transatlantic intelligence cooperation has been a cornerstone of Western security for decades. Programs like the Five Eyes alliance (which includes the UK, a post-Brexit outlier) have proven resilient despite political turbulence. By pivoting inward, Europe risks isolating itself further. What happens if a future U.S. administration recommits to NATO? Will this new European network simply dissolve, or will it create parallel structures that duplicate efforts and waste resources? The POLITICO piece notes the incorporation of intelligence officials into Brussels representations, but this could foster a culture of secrecy and unaccountability within the EU’s already opaque institutions. High-ranking officials briefed by a “domestic intelligence unit” sound efficient, but it raises red flags about democratic oversight. Who watches the watchers in this setup?

Let’s not forget the elephant in the room: Europe’s internal fractures. The continent is hardly a monolith. Eastern European nations like Poland and the Baltic states view Russian threats through the lens of historical trauma, while Western powers like Germany have been accused of naivety toward Moscow (remember Nord Stream?). Mistrust isn’t just a relic of the past; it’s alive and well. Hungary’s Viktor Orbán has cozied up to Putin, and intelligence leaks could expose rifts that Russia exploits. A joint operation might force uncomfortable compromises—say, sharing data with a member state whose loyalties are questionable. The idea of a “CIA-style” agency is particularly alarming. The CIA, for all its successes, has a checkered history of overreach, from covert operations in Latin America to domestic surveillance scandals. Transplanting that model to Europe, with its diverse legal systems and privacy laws (hello, GDPR), could lead to mission creep. What starts as countering Russian aggression might expand into monitoring domestic dissent or economic espionage among allies.

Privacy and civil liberties are another casualty waiting to happen. The EU’s push for more powerful agencies comes at a time when digital surveillance is already under scrutiny. A centralized intelligence hub would amass vast troves of data from across borders, potentially violating the rights of millions. We’ve seen how national agencies like the UK’s GCHQ have pushed boundaries; scaling that up to an EU level invites abuse. And effectiveness? Color me skeptical. Russian aggression isn’t just about spies—it’s hybrid warfare involving disinformation, cyber attacks, and economic coercion. A shiny new agency won’t magically solve these if underlying issues like energy dependence on Russia persist. In fact, centralization could create a single point of failure: one major breach, and the entire network crumbles, handing Putin propaganda win.

Proponents argue this is about self-sufficiency in a multipolar world. Fair enough, but self-sufficiency doesn’t mean reinventing the wheel. Europe should strengthen existing bilateral and multilateral ties—bolster NATO’s intelligence-sharing, invest in cyber defenses, and address internal vulnerabilities like corruption and foreign influence—without the hubris of building a super-spy empire. The past year’s developments, as POLITICO describes, feel more like a knee-jerk reaction to U.S. politics than a strategic masterstroke. Remember, the EU was born from economic integration, not espionage. Forcing it into the shadows could alienate citizens already wary of “Brussels elites.”

While the threat from Russia is real and America’s unpredictability is concerning, rushing into a joint intelligence operation is a step backward. It risks amplifying divisions, eroding freedoms, and creating an unwieldy beast that distracts from real solutions. Europe would be wiser to build resilience through cooperation, not centralization. Otherwise, this “unthinkable” idea might just become an unforgettable mistake.

By HD Hartmann