Let us begin with today’s first topic: the Mecca Pact. The mutual defense agreement between Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia was signed in Mecca—a highly symbolic location, as it is the holiest site in Islam. There has been much discussion regarding this new agreement, as it effectively signals a shift toward a Middle East where the United States is no longer the sole security guarantor—a somewhat “post-American” Middle East. Of course, the U.S. will maintain a significant presence—if not in terms of troop numbers, then certainly in terms of political influence—across various parts of the region; however, for the first time since the era of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the U.S. is no longer the exclusive security guarantor for the Gulf states. This defense agreement is essentially an expansion of the pact concluded between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan last September; it operates much like NATO’s Article 5, meaning that an attack on one of the three nations is treated as an attack on all three. The three nations involved are also significant: we are dealing with the Arab world’s leading economy (Saudi Arabia), the Islamic world’s only nuclear power (Pakistan), and NATO’s second-largest military power, Turkey.

It is an alliance that encompasses a bit of everything, so to speak; we are talking about states that have all been careful to pursue multipolar foreign policies and maintain diverse partnerships—with both the US and Russia. China is a key player in relations with all three. Its ties with Pakistan are arguably the closest officially, given their “unshakable friendship.” However, Turkey, for instance, also has agreements with Qatar and Kuwait, thereby bringing a larger part of the Islamic world into the fold. In fact, I have been told that this is merely the first step in this defense pact, and more Arab nations are expected to join.

Many are now questioning the purpose of this pact, given the existing agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan—one that has yielded no tangible results over the past year. After all, Saudi Arabia—or rather, US military bases within the country—came under attack by Iran, yet we saw no move by Pakistan to intervene in their defense or issue nuclear threats against Iran. On the contrary, Pakistan actually sought to mediate and cultivate closer ties with Iran. This is precisely where the sensitive issue lies: while this triad might theoretically signal the formation of a military pact against Iran—a country currently hostile to all three—it is actually directed against Israel, at least in terms of rhetoric. We are dealing with states that have voiced strong, or even vehement, opposition to Israel in recent years—particularly since the outbreak of the war in Gaza and the tensions involving Iran—and this development is what most deeply concerns Israel.

There is a lot to be said here. As I’ve mentioned before: is there any state in the world that truly opposes Israel outright? After all, we would have seen some moves in that direction—especially during the war in Gaza. Not a single soldier was sent from that country to defend the Palestinians; so, it seems obvious to me that there couldn’t be a ‘de facto’ pact against Israel. Yet, rhetorically and politically, they position themselves against Israel—which is quite interesting. Another interesting point is that, since this pact was announced, numerous rumors have surfaced—unconfirmed as yet, but discussed across most serious international media outlets—regarding a future defense agreement involving a different defense axis. This would also comprise Middle Eastern states: specifically, an axis formed by the United Arab Emirates (which haven’t been getting along well with the Saudis lately), Israel, and—surprisingly—India.

So, you have India—Pakistan’s adversary—alongside the UAE—Saudi Arabia’s adversary—and Israel, which, in theory, is the adversary of all three. It’s a fascinating rumor. It seems plausible, even if unconfirmed; however, I’ll wait for official confirmation before offering my own analysis—otherwise, there’s no point in wasting time.

Other notable or interesting absences that were discussed include that of Morocco—a country I believe will join the rumored axis linking the United Arab Emirates, Israel, and India. Bahrain’s absence was also notable, given that it is the Gulf state most exposed in terms of security and the one most dependent on other nations—primarily Saudi Arabia. Consequently, expectations were that Bahrain would be present.

Then there is the matter of Egypt. As a highly significant state, Egypt would—so to speak—be a natural fourth member; it plays a crucial role regarding Gaza, Palestine, and the conflict there, as well as within the “R4” (Regional 4) group, where Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt meet to consult on regional issues. Furthermore, in recent years, Egypt has developed increasingly strong military ties with Turkey, despite earlier tensions stemming from the 2013 coup—when Morsi was ousted from power—and the conflict in Libya.

So, there were reasons for Egypt to join. There are two theories. Either Egypt refused to join because it does not yet feel ready to play a role in an axis that excludes Israel, the United Arab Emirates, or the US—given that the Egyptians still rely heavily on the US. However, another theory is that Saudi Arabia opposed Egypt’s inclusion in the security pact, at least for the next few years, due to lingering tensions between the two countries. Bear in mind that Saudi Arabia was the largest financial backer of Sisi’s government after he took power from Morsi in 2013. They provided $25 billion to support Cairo’s economy, yet the Saudis felt they were not adequately reciprocated when it came to international issues.

More often than not, Cairo sided with the United Arab Emirates in disputes between the Saudis and the Emiratis. That was likely the issue. Riyadh would not want Egypt as an initial member, although, should the alliance expand, we can assume that Egypt would be among the next to join.

For the moment, it must be said that all parties stand to gain from this plan. Ankara needs to establish as many export markets as possible for its weapons and military hardware, making this alliance with Saudi Arabia highly beneficial; it also requires good relations with Pakistan, given that Pakistan is the only Muslim state possessing nuclear weapons. Furthermore, considering the threats Israel has directed at Turkey in recent months, it is clear why Turkey would need such an alliance.

Saudi Arabia also requires this support from Turkey’s defense industry; the Kingdom lacks a substantial arsenal and is not particularly effective in combat—as evidenced by the situation in Yemen, where it achieved little despite incurring massive costs. It also relies on the security umbrella provided by Pakistan—an arrangement already in place—and, in the wake of the conflict with Iran, needs to send clear international signals that it has reduced its dependence on the US, a partner that has proven unable to guarantee either the security of investments or consistent influence in the region. As for Pakistan, its objectives are the most opaque, so to speak.

For the moment, it must be said that all parties stand to gain from this plan. Ankara needs to establish as many export markets as possible for its weapons and military hardware, making this alliance with Saudi Arabia highly beneficial; it also requires good relations with Pakistan, given that Pakistan is the only Muslim state possessing nuclear weapons. Furthermore, considering the threats Israel has directed at Turkey in recent months, it is clear why Turkey would need such an alliance.

Saudi Arabia also requires this support from Turkey’s defense industry; the Kingdom lacks a substantial arsenal and is not particularly effective in combat—as evidenced by the situation in Yemen, where it achieved little despite incurring massive costs. It also relies on the security umbrella provided by Pakistan—an arrangement already in place—and, in the wake of the conflict with Iran, needs to send clear international signals that it has reduced its dependence on the US, a partner that has proven unable to guarantee either the security of investments or consistent influence in the region. As for Pakistan, its objectives are the most opaque, so to speak.

It is not necessarily obvious what Pakistan stands to gain, but many speculate that the Pakistanis actually need financial and diplomatic support from Saudi Arabia, as well as alternative export markets to guard against potential future embargoes. Should the conflict with India or Afghanistan persist—potentially leading to Western sanctions—they need to maintain a diverse range of partnerships. I hope I have provided a solid summary of the factors involved in this new defense pact. I will revisit the topic in the coming weeks—once we see if any announcements regarding a possible defense pact emerge from the United Arab Emirates—to offer a more comprehensive analysis.

By Daria Gusa

www.solidnews.ro