Saudi Iranian rapprochement: An Opportunity for China’s Regional Aspirations

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, and Minister of State and national security adviser of Saudi Arabia Musaad bin Mohammed Al Aiban during a meeting in Beijing, China Pic Source: Reuters/ China Daily
The Arab League’s latest decision to readmit Syria to the organization stirs controversy in policy circles, particularly in Washington. While some analysts perceive this move as a “diplomatic breakthrough”, others believe that it is not expected to put an end to the prolonged crisis that started in 2011. This, in turn, has brought back the debate over the ongoing Saudi-Iranian rapprochement under the auspices of China. The success of the Arab initiative towards Syria is conditioned by the ability of Riyadh and Tehran to keep their regional spat under control. It is too naive, nevertheless, to predict an end to the Iranian-Saudi competition anytime soon. Particularly after Ibrahim Raisi’s visit to Damascus amid Arab talks on Syria’s return to the league. Though analysts perceived the visit positively, others believe it aimed to dictate to Syria Tehran’s conditions for rapprochement with Arabs. The latter explanation seems more plausible. Iran won’t give up on its ambitions in Damascus. The rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, hence, is confined to one goal: controlling its spat with Saudi Arabia. Many people are concerned about how China will benefit from mediating a deal between Tehran and Riyadh.
China’s rise in the Gulf
Before the Cold War, China was entirely focused on its domestic concerns. This changed, nonetheless, with the end of the Cold War and the rise of Beijing as a major importer of oil. However, China remained committed to a cautious framework in the region. It relied on what analysts describe as “strategic hedging”. It avoided, frankly, challenging the American-led security framework in the region. This was prompted by its domestic and strategic concerns. However, this started to change amid relatively growing military purchases in the region. It moved towards what is described as “strategic wedging,” whereby it seeks to expand its commitments to the region and directly challenge the American presence. Perhaps that is why it succeeded in mediating between Saudi Arabia and Iran. After years of building trust, China was able to play a mediating role and strengthen its relations with both sides, taking advantage of Washington’s retreat. However, many questions are raised about the future of this rapprochement, perhaps the most prominent of which is whether it will translate into a political solution in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen. On the one hand, this rapprochement is a good opportunity to ease tensions in the region, especially with the Arab League’s announcement of Syria’s return to the Arab fold and the negotiations between the Houthis and the Kingdom in the previous months. However, this does not mean that the “period of rest” will translate into a political solution to the Iranian-Saudi rivalry. It would be difficult to expect an end to the conflict in the upcoming decades in light of Iran’s nuclear aspirations, the Israeli-Iranian rift, and Saudi Arabia’s aspiration for regional leadership. In light of these developments, we can conclude that China is the main beneficiary of this rapprochement, which will enhance its credibility at the regional and international levels and may pave the way for mediation between the West and Russia.
By Maysa Mohamed Fouly