Russia’s Parliamentary Election Forecast Confirms the Victory of the Putin Establishment. “Normality, Patriotism, Anti-Progressivism!
This weekend, Russia is holding the ninth legislative election in its post-Soviet history, an event that has largely escaped public attention because of the lack of clear analysis of these elections in the Western press. To be sure, there have been scattered negative reports about the Kremlin and the lack of democracy in Moscow, but far fewer than in previous years.
How can we explain this lack of interest in the Russian elections? It cannot simply be attributed to the fact that the winner is already known. Rather, in my view, this suspicious lack of attention serves two defining purposes: avoiding wider exposure to political messages coming from Russian parties that might appeal to some Europeans, and avoiding the questions that would naturally be asked of Zelensky regarding Ukraine’s own elections, which still have not taken place.
If the Russian elections were discussed seriously, that would also require acknowledging the normality of holding them, as well as the fact that Russia does not appear to be so severely affected by the war that elections have become impossible, unlike Ukraine, where the conflict has apparently kept the country away from any democratic vote.
I find it difficult to imagine that European journalists are simply too busy covering the supposedly compelling news and events surrounding the first Summit of the Carpathian Integration Initiative in Ukraine, a summit to which Nicușor Dan was merely invited, despite the Romanian Presidential Administration itself reminding us that more than half of the Carpathian Mountains lie within Romania.
I would nevertheless like to present the main parties and their messages here, in order to show that the central unifying theme is consistent with the message Russia has sought to promote under Putin: one centered on Orthodoxy and anti-progressivism.
From the limited figures currently available, we once again see a clear dominance by United Russia, Putin’s party, although it appears to be slightly weaker than in the previous election.
| Party | 2021 Result | VTsIOM Poll, Sept. 6, 2026 | FOM Forecast, Sept. 10 |
|---|---|---|---|
| United Russia | 49.8% | 37.4% | 47–49% |
| KPRF (Communists) | 18.9% | 13.1% | 14–17% |
| LDPR | 7.6% | 9.9% | 10–12% |
| A Just Russia | 7.5% | 4.5% | 6–7% |
| New People | 5.3% | 10.4% | 8–9% |
Over this official picture, however, came an information-warfare episode in June that is worth mentioning, even if the source has a direct interest in the conflict.
Zelensky published documents on his social media accounts that he presented as internal sociological reports intercepted by Ukrainian intelligence and intended for Putin’s office. According to these alleged leaks, Putin’s approval rating was expected to fall to 55% by September 20, while disapproval would rise to 33%. United Russia, meanwhile, was supposedly polling at only 22%, less than half the FOM forecast, followed by New People at 17%, the Communists at 14%, LDPR at 10% and A Just Russia at 6%.
Zelensky went further, suggesting that the discrepancy would force the Kremlin into “significantly greater falsification” of the result.
When I commented on Zelensky’s post a few months ago during my weekly programme, I concluded that Zelensky must in fact be an extremely well-covered Russian agent, having reminded the West of Putin’s high approval rating in the very same week that several opinion polls in the democratic West showed approval ratings below 20% for figures such as Merz, Macron and Starmer. Taking each party separately, United Russia remains the dominant force however one calculates the percentages.
The Duma has 450 seats: 225 are allocated through party lists, with a 5% threshold, and 225 through single-member constituencies. As a result, United Russia can receive less than half of the party-list vote and still secure an overwhelming parliamentary majority. In 2021, the party won 198 of the 225 single-member constituencies. The key thresholds to watch are 226 seats for an absolute majority and 300 for a two-thirds majority.
The candidate list brings together the state administration, including Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin, with prominent figures associated with the war: frontline correspondent Yevgeny Poddubny, Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova, who is subject to an International Criminal Court warrant over the transfer of Ukrainian children, veteran Vladislav Golovin and the leader of Yunarmiya, Russia’s military youth organisation.
A prominent figure appearing on the list does not necessarily mean that person will eventually take up a seat, but it is clear that these candidates are intended to demonstrate that the state administration and the front are part of the same political project, and that a vote for United Russia is also a vote in support of the armed forces. The most interesting story in this election concerns the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, LDPR, which lost its flamboyant founder Vladimir Zhirinovsky following his death in 2022. Leonid Slutsky, Zhirinovsky’s successor and Russia’s representative in the 2022 negotiations with Ukraine, lacks Zhirinovsky’s charisma and is attempting to rebuild the LDPR’s visibility through spectacular personalities.
The most striking of these is Viktor Bout, the so-called “Merchant of Death”, who was convicted in the United States on charges including conspiracy to kill American citizens and provide support to a terrorist organisation. He was released in December 2022 in exchange for basketball player Brittney Griner, and was soon afterwards elected to the regional legislature in Ulyanovsk. He now appears fifth on the federal list, immediately after Slutsky, commander Vereshchagin and campaign chief Voropaeva, a position that virtually guarantees him a seat in the Duma if the party performs in line with current polling.
Beyond the fact that Bout is already internationally famous, with Hollywood helping to cement that image through the excellent 2005 film Lord of War, in which a character inspired by Bout is played by Nicolas Cage, the rest of his public image is entirely consistent with the type of Christian patriotism and anti-progressivism promoted by the Kremlin. Bout’s painting exhibitions have received financial support from the Russian Peace Foundation, headed by Slutsky, Patriarch Kirill and Anatoly Torkunov, rector of MGIMO, Russia’s leading university for international relations, among others. The foundation’s reports mention not only the promotion of Orthodox Christianity but also spending on equipment for participants in the war.
The LDPR’s government programme, titled “100 Days of Russia’s Transformation”, focuses on a possible military victory in Ukraine, tax exemptions for low-income earners and cuts to social benefits for migrants. The Communists led by Gennady Zyuganov remain the principal vehicle within the system through which social dissatisfaction can be expressed. Their message focuses on nationalisation, industry and pensions, but combines these positions rather than opposing them to support for the “special military operation” and socially conservative rhetoric. The difference from 2021 is crucial. At that time, the KPRF also attracted protest voters who simply wanted to cast a ballot against the system.
The party leadership’s explicit support for the invasion has broken that bridge and will most likely lead to a decline in its number of seats. A Just Russia, the most fragile parliamentary party, is also the most instructive. FOM places it above the 5% threshold, while VTsIOM puts it close to exclusion. The party has renominated only 17 of its 27 outgoing deputies, a clear sign of forced reconfiguration.
The final appeal issued by its leader Sergey Mironov combines, much like the KPRF, left-wing economic redistribution, including tariff freezes and taxes on the wealthy, with right-wing social authoritarianism, including harsh restrictions on migrants and capital punishment for corruption. The most interesting name on the list is Sergey Arbuzov, a former First Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine, who has been included on the segment of the list covering occupied territories, including Crimea.
The incorporation of former Ukrainian elites into the parliamentary representation of annexed territories shows that Moscow has reached the stage of envisaging their permanent administrative integration. The New People party is probably the only one presenting a genuinely different social message: normal, modern life without additional administrative complications. Its “Russia for Life” campaign calls for direct mayoral elections, greater fiscal resources for the regions, and openly opposes abortion restrictions and internet shutdowns. It is not an anti-war party, but it represents a second definition of “normality” competing with the Kremlin’s version, one centred on everyday life without additional state prohibitions.
Its rise in the polls compared with the previous election shows that this niche exists and is not insignificant, even though, like all the other parties, it remains an accepted participant in the system rather than a force challenging Putin’s power. The only election-related controversy to receive substantial coverage in the West concerns Yabloko, the party excluded by the Supreme Court last month and barred from taking part on the national list.
Various pretexts were used to eliminate it from the election, including the use of an American song, although the complaint was submitted by the small nationalist Rodina party, which has only one deputy in parliament, rather than directly by the authorities. The exclusion was not total, however, as 106 representatives of the party are still standing individually. Yabloko is clearly pro-European, directly opposes the war in Ukraine, advocates greater rights for LGBT people, and takes a secular and pluralistic approach to religion rather than one centred on Orthodoxy.
In comparison with Yabloko, we can see that the common thread running through all these parties is Russia’s new “normality” as a shared electoral product. If we look at the clear differences between their current messages and those of 2021, the Kremlin has constructed, both legislatively and culturally, a well-defined conservative framework based primarily on family and Christian values. Concrete examples include the expansion in 2022 of the law against so-called “LGBT propaganda”, the designation in 2023 of the “international LGBT movement” as extremist, and the unanimous 2024 Duma vote banning “childfree propaganda”.
Even support for continuing the war effort in Ukraine is reframed within this context as support for a struggle against polarising and, in some cases, distorted values promoted by the West, making it easier for the average Russian citizen to accept. The only party opposing this ideological struggle with the West, rather than the military one, is the party excluded from the national list. All those with a realistic chance of entering the Duma have therefore aligned themselves, in one way or another, with this new unifying and conservative message of a Christian Russia.
As for the forecast itself, United Russia will obviously retain its absolute majority, most likely comfortably above the 226 seats required, thanks in particular to the single-member constituencies. I do not believe electoral fraud will be necessary to secure this outcome, even though many argue that this is precisely why the area covered by remote electronic voting has been expanded. KPRF, LDPR and A Just Russia will return to parliament, although the latter will probably only just clear the threshold, while New People is likely to confirm a result close to double its 2021 score.
Viktor Bout will become a federal deputy and will be one of the few internationally recognisable Russian figures used to promote anti-progressive messaging, although he has no realistic prospect of reaching the highest levels of domestic politics. Perhaps the most important conclusion from these elections, beyond the rewriting of Russian national identity around the idea of “normality”, remains the same as after the previous election: we still cannot identify any clear successor to Vladimir Putin.
Important figures in domestic Russian politics remain largely absent from the international press, limiting speculation or sympathy around potential successors. Just ask yourself whether you even know the name Mikhail Mishustin, who has already been Russia’s prime minister for six years.
For the moment, however, what we see is a stable Putin regime, capable of absorbing various forms of dissatisfaction with Russia’s economy through the other parties participating in the electoral system and which, because of or thanks to the disorder in the West, does not face social discontent serious enough to force it to co-opt or admit parties such as Yabloko into parliament.
