How can a government be formed in Israel? Netanyahu’s Perspectives - thediplomaticaffairs.com

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Middle East Op-Ed October 31, 2026

How can a government be formed in Israel? Netanyahu’s Perspectives

The final topic concerns the elections in Israel—the last item remaining on the agenda. These were highly significant elections. You could see just how panicked Netanyahu became in the days leading up to them. Last week, four days before the vote, he ordered a total lockdown of the West Bank after two gunmen opened fire at an intersection, wounding five Israelis. He tried desperately to recreate a state of war, because Netanyahu’s policies—which are highly aggressive and, to a calm, pragmatic voter, quite irrational—thrive best in wartime. He kept warning that Iran might attack Israel before the elections took place.

In every poll, Netanyahu’s popularity had declined. On Polymarket, just one day before the election, Netanyahu’s chances of remaining Prime Minister stood at only 27%, while his main rival—Gadi Eisenkot, whom I’ve mentioned to you—had risen to 58%. On Election Day, Netanyahu made over 20 posts, urging people to go out and vote. He shared videos—he did absolutely everything he could—yet it seemed he wouldn’t be very successful. Even Ronald Lauder, president of the World Jewish Congress—a long-time friend of Netanyahu—turned against him. Many expected both Netanyahu and Trump’s preferred candidate to lose, much like what had happened just days earlier in Serbia and Brazil.

Yet, surprisingly—following the highest voter turnout seen in recent years—Netanyahu’s party secured the largest number of seats, 27 out of 120, while his right-wing coalition won 53 seats. Eisenkot’s coalition took 48 seats. The real news—the headline—is that Arab parties won 19 seats, an all-time record. In a sense, this figure isn’t even particularly high; after all, the Arab population in Israel—specifically those holding Israeli citizenship and the right to vote—accounts for roughly 20%, or one-fifth, of the total population. If we were to include other Arab residents living in the Israeli-occupied territories, the percentage would be significantly higher. Nevertheless, the Arab population with Israeli citizenship—that 20%—had never before achieved such a result. Perhaps this was due to a push for “strategic voting”—or who knows? Regardless, this was the true surprise.

Netanyahu appears alarmed by this outcome. Likud, his party, has submitted hundreds of testimonies and pieces of evidence to the police, alleging electoral fraud in numerous Arab polling stations. The claims include the discovery of thousands of envelopes containing cash, ballots cast for Ra’am, instances of intimidation, violence against election officials, and multiple voting—among other things. In essence, Netanyahu is alleging fraud, arguing that these parties could never have achieved such a result. To me, however, the outcome seems perfectly legitimate.

The issue right now does not lie with these Arab parties. The problem is that neither Netanyahu nor Eisenkot has managed to secure a majority through their respective coalitions. A total of 61 seats—half plus one—is required to control the Knesset. It is worth noting that Netanyahu’s bloc holds only 53 seats, while Eisenkot’s bloc has just 48. The point is that if Eisenkot’s bloc were to agree to an alliance or coalition with the Arab parties—or, at the very least, reach an arrangement where the Arab parties voted to invest an Eisenkot-led government (even without being part of the coalition itself, effectively accepting a minority government)—then governing would become quite straightforward. The complication, however, is that although Eisenkot is viewed as the candidate of the center or even the left, nearly half of his coalition actually consists of right-wing parties that would never accept such an arrangement.

Furthermore, Avigdor Lieberman—leader of the Yisrael Beiteinu party, which is considered far-right, yet remains aligned with Eisenkot’s camp—stated last night that he has cut off contact with Eisenkot, Bennett, and Lapid. He declared that he will neither join nor support, under any circumstances, a government that relies on the votes of Arab representatives. His party holds seven seats in Parliament. Consequently, if Lieberman were to switch sides to Netanyahu, only one additional parliamentary vote would be needed to secure a majority—a goal that would likely not be very difficult to achieve, should Lieberman indeed change his mind.

One initial option for Israel right now would be to form this alliance. The problem, however, is that Lieberman is a personal adversary of Netanyahu; he campaigned against him. Consequently, it would amount to a form of long-term political suicide for both Lieberman and Netanyahu. Netanyahu does not have much left to lose, but Lieberman certainly does. It remains to be seen whether he can be persuaded.

A second option is a minority government led by Eisenkot, supported on an ad-hoc basis by Arab parties—since a formal alliance seems rather unlikely.

A third option involves an alliance between Eisenkot’s faction and the Arab parties. Even if Lieberman—and his seven parliamentary seats—were to be excluded, the bloc would still hold 19 seats, requiring only one additional vote, which would be easy to secure.

Alternatively, there is the possibility of a Netanyahu–Eisenkot national unity government. Whether this is plausible remains to be seen; it might become more so if, in the coming weeks, a large-scale war with Iran were to break out. This would provide a new justification for a national unity government, effectively offering both Netanyahu and Eisenkot a form of political absolution.

These are, broadly speaking, the main options. A coalition of some sort must be formed and put to a vote within the next four weeks; we shall see if any government can successfully pass. If none of these scenarios materialize—and if the country enters a prolonged period of negotiations—Netanyahu would remain as interim Prime Minister for an extended duration. Should this state of affairs persist, it could ultimately lead to snap elections—a scenario we are familiar with from our own experience. Among the current options, unfortunately, the most likely one—in my view—is this last scenario: that a war is manufactured, or even reignited, to make a national unity government a plausible outcome. Without Lieberman, I am not sure if Eisenkot could afford to also sideline Naftali Bennett and his party, B’Yachad. He truly could not afford to do that. Consequently, an alliance with the Arab parties is out of the question. The only other possibility would be for Netanyahu to bring Lieberman over to his side, but even that is highly, highly unlikely.

This electoral ploy worked out for Netanyahu; as we also saw in the case of Bolojan, if you are a leader whom the majority of the population wants to remove from power, it actually serves your interests to remain as an interim prime minister. Furthermore, in Netanyahu’s case, it is advantageous if the war reignites or if a new threat emerges against the country, because people will then have much greater problems to contend with. This is not our country, and I didn’t necessarily have a stake in these elections. Personally, I must admit that I dislike Netanyahu, but what concerns me even more is that, in all my conversations with Israeli acquaintances and friends, every single one of them expressed a strong desire for him to be replaced. This is because Netanyahu has damaged Israel’s reputation—and, in some instances, even the reputation of the Jewish people. I honestly don’t know anyone who is an ardent fan of Netanyahu these days. Let us hope that the situation in Israel eventually stabilizes, because Netanyahu’s actions are harmful not only to the Palestinians but to the Israelis as well.

By Daria Gusa

www.solidnews.ro

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