The fragile communication of a potential war in the Middle East

Responding to a direct attack on its premise, the Iranians had a political and military obligation to respond. A regime that has led proxy wars for so long, and is engaged in a never-ending narrative with the West, cannot go radio silent on such a blunt attack, particularly to save face domestically, while appeasing their regional proxies, who are also playing along in the game of containment.

In the art of war, the response is accepted and most of all expected. To make matters more significant regarding the strategy and intent that the Iranians had in mind; according to Iran’s foreign minister, Hossein Amirabdollahia, information about the attack was given to the US and their allies 72 hours before launching the strikes.

Although the US denied receiving such data, Turkish, Jordanian, and Iraqi officials have all confirmed such information.

A series of anecdotes was launched right after 99% of the Iranian drones and missiles, according to Israel, failed to hit given targets. Several reports quoted Iranian officials saying that they are done. That they did what they wanted, they responded, and that was it. It might sound “funny” to have hundreds of drones and missiles be brought to an end with a “we’re done” statement, but the political communication behind it is far greater.

According to analysts, this was a show of force, with no intent to cause severe casualties. But the obvious repercussions on the region are far wider than subliminal messages sent between the two countries. The Iranian response did not come in a vacuum, Israel has been targeting direct Iranian placements and Iran-backed interests in Syria for years. At this point, it is also clear that avoiding the spread of the Gaza war, which has been the subject of countless diplomatic efforts, can no longer be contained.

The ongoing Gaza war has been the center of mediation and significant international efforts, with most resulting in no impact. The United Nations meetings, councils, and resolutions have not been able to move the needle, and yet, the UN remains the main point of reference for discussion, mostly.

Instead of resorting to international organizations and holding bilateral talks, the Iranians literally took it to the media. They made their response so public that they even shared their strategic plans. In the days following the attack the war seemed to have been transported from the ground to the media, where all sorts of analysis and news roamed freely about the true intent behind such an attack that was somehow advertised, shared, and concluded in front of the whole world to judge.

Iran cannot afford going into an all-out war and does not want to. Neither Washington nor Tehran are eager to engage in direct confrontations, the way the message was conveyed to the Israeli and the Iranian communication online says as much. Iran’s strength lies in mobilizing its proxies in the region and having concerted efforts launched against Israel.

Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and its military presence in Syria could all be called upon to react. Yet it looks like even those efforts will be limited and very targeted. The proxies so far have shown a great deal of restraint and that is not only because of the Iranian leadership but also because of local complications.

Hezbollah finds itself in one of its weakest political positions within Lebanon. A country ravaged by corruption and failed political and economic systems unable to reboot is leaving the Lebanese nation in a state of disarray, unwilling to support, fund, or even endorse any sort of retaliation against Israel, outside the ongoing battles in the south.

According to an article that appeared in the Lebanese press, even Syria has reservations from having Iran carry out any move from its territory. According to sources who spoke to L’Orient-Le Jour Syrian President Bashar al-Assad opposed any initiative that would entail launching an offensive from Syrian territories as an Iranian retaliation against Israel.

“When Iran was still considering its response to Israel, a major operation from Syrian territory to destroy Israeli military sites and infrastructure in the occupied Golan Heights was considered […] Since a diplomatic representation had been targeted on Syrian soil, it seemed logical for Iran to respond from Syrian territory.” According to the report, Assad refused.

An article on Axios highlighted the fragile cautiousness of the US in handling the Iranians at the moment. Iran was outspoken when it came to US involvement in strikes against its interests and its support to the Israeli defensive efforts: it holds the US responsible.

Nevertheless, the back channels provide a more nuanced approach to the issue. Both countries want to avoid what would be a costly war. The US will keep supporting its regional ally, however, there is increasing frustration from the Biden administration around the lack of appropriate coordination from the Israeli side. The US narrative in closed meetings, might deflate the situation and provide enough stability to avoid further escalation.

Iran, which does not have any diplomatic relations or direct communication with the US, still found a way to use regional countries and other channels to prove to Washington that it does not want to engage in any direct conflict. Iran is happy with the status quo, even if its nation is not.

A piece by the Financial Times specified how Iranian oil exports are at an all-time-high, despite the sanctions “Iran is exporting more oil than at any time for the past six years, giving its economy a $35bn-a-year boost even as western countries discuss stepping up sanctions in response to its attack on Israel.”

Every effort is currently being exerted to ensure that any other potential response remains limited and targeted. Escalation might not be completely inevitable but could be restricted, which is what everyone is hoping.

Hope in geopolitics is a poor plan, and if history is of any lesson, a disproportionate attack or any sort of miscalculation can slide the whole region into a multitude of proxy wars. They will be fought on various fronts, by various players, pitting governments against militias, and countries against others.

The US and the West are urging Israel against carrying out military actions, but the lines are blurred as to who can influence Iran to de-escalate the situation, as the whole region scrambles for stability. A plan to avert this catastrophic scenario can still be drawn: the US and the Gulf will have to play a balancing act that would ensure political stability, maintain oil prices and availability, and find a suitable solution for Gaza. The region is betting on megaprojects, lucrative bids, and tourism – even the Gulf states do not want to see travel warnings being issued by foreign offices for coming to the region.

This could happen today, given the right concessions, agreements, and regional priorities.

By Marita Kassis