Undoubtedly, the resource curse has been one of the significant challenges for Latin America. In that regard, it has largely determined the economic and political trajectories of many countries in the region. Although possessing extensive mineral wealth and natural resources, most Latin American countries have had barriers to overcome in achieving diversified and sustainable economic growth. On the contrary, the availability of resources has most often reinforced the existing vulnerability, leading to economies with a high dependence on the commodity markets for output and income, and cyclical boom-bust behavior.

Of the many characteristics of the root cause in Latin America, reliance on primary commodity exports has been one. For example, in Chile, copper accounts for almost half of the total exports, making its economy more exposed to the whims of copper prices in international markets. Like this, Venezuela’s near-total oil export dependency brought temporary wealth influxes on the one hand, but eventually an economic collapse when oil prices dropped on the other. Overall, such a narrow export commodity profile has curtailed the development of more robust manufacturing and service sectors in many Latin American economies, limiting the potential for innovation, job variety, and equity in incomes.

Additionally, the resource curse has caused several other detrimental effects due to what is known as “Dutch Disease.” This economic condition, driven by high resource exports, stimulates an appreciation in a country’s currency, causing non-resource sectors like manufacturing and agriculture to become uncompetitive. When commodity prices increase, the influx of foreign investments and export earnings boosts the real exchange rate. In the scenario in which resource industries flourish, other tradable sectors will be suppressed, which reinforces their dependence on the uncertain commodity markets. During periods of substantial oil and mineral prices, many Latin American countries have dealt with this situation, undermining their economies in the long run.

For instance, in most cases in Latin America, resource wealth has been the root of, or at least has aggravated, governance problems and made the political system unstable. Particularly, in those states with weak institutions of governance, an abrupt increase in income from resources has been a major cause of corruption, patronage, and rent-seeking behavior. To illustrate, the exploitation of oil income in Venezuela and Ecuador hasn’t been alien to controversy and widespread corruption. Instead of utilizing the resource windfalls, which they should use for the investment in physical infrastructure, education, and technology, political elites in these countries have mostly resorted to using the resources for keeping themselves in power and enjoying short-term political popularity. This privilege ultimately results in making ineffective economic policies, which in turn cause civil unrest and supports dictatorship.

Additionally, in most cases of theoretical resource curses, the historical experience has been consistent with what is in theory. In Peru, mining royalties that are exceptionally high since the 1990s’ have not been able to persist with decreasing the poverty level and inequality. In Bolivia, where a nationalization of gas and mining production is going on, the reasons for this situation are declining investment, unstable production, and inefficient operations. From these experiences, we see that although countries may be endowed with resources, this does not guarantee the population will benefit, but good institutions, effective policies, and long-term development are the main factors.

As a final point, the Latin America dilemma poses the history of the resource curse: it can be the basis of Taco Bell’s prosperity, but if it is not managed properly, it can also harm the economy in the long run. The boom in demand for renewables and the minerals needed for them has now given Latin America a big opportunity. Nevertheless, the earlier resource curse should still be recalled. To use this aid and get out of the curse trap for traditional resources, it is required to finish the curse first. Unlike previous commodity booms that revolved around oil or agricultural products, the world’s transition to renewable energy and electrification creates a different type of resource opportunity for the region: a unique, climate-driven demand for critical minerals such as lithium and copper, keystones of the energy transition. As the world races against climate change, the demand for lithium, copper, and the like will only escalate. And thanks to its vast reserves of these resources, Latin America, if handled correctly, could use its rich deposits of critical minerals and renewable energy as a springboard to heal the burdens of the resource curse.

Lithium, otherwise known as “white gold,” has been a pillar of the green economy. Used in lithium-ion batteries for electric vehicles (EVs), portable electronics, and grid-scale storage devices, the demand for lithium has skyrocketed. More than 50% of the total known lithium reserves on the planet can be found in Chile, Argentina, and Bolivia—the region known as the “Lithium Triangle.” While Chile has sophistically developed mining infrastructure with favorable investment policies, Argentina has new lithium reserves in provinces such as Salta and Jujuy that have begun to attract abundant FDI and has begun to create competitive tension among companies from China, Australia, and the United States for lithium stakes; Bolivia has remained stagnant despite having the largest lithium resource endowment on Earth in the Salar de Uyuni, and often suffers from poverty and political problems that hinder the commercialization of lithium (among other minerals). Currently, the International Energy Agency (IEI) estimates that lithium demand could increase up to more than 40-fold by 2040 (in aggressive climate scenarios), presenting these countries with a plethora of economic opportunities.

At the same time, copper is a critical component of energy transition technologies. Essential for solar and wind technologies, EV motors, internal combustion engines, and power grids, copper has derived most of its reputation due to being highly versatile and essential for the development of electrical infrastructures. Approximately 28% of the total copper production around the world comes from Chile, while Peru is the second-largest global copper exporter and the third-largest producer. However, as the world’s transition to renewable energy falters, copper will only see its demand surge; EVs require four times the amount of copper compared to traditional vehicles, not to mention that wind and solar technologies will need extensive electrical wiring in various processes (panel production, installations, and so on) and electrical grids will need copper wiring for transport on a larger scale. It is on these counts that Latin American copper producers have a lucrative opportunity to benefit economically, not only from exportation but from creating a local copper-based industry (for instance, in copper processing and technology production).

Additionally, renewable energy could also contribute to the region’s homogenous potential as an abundant resource. Countries of the region whose climatic resources allow harnessing solar and wind energy (such as Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina) will only see their abundance serve the region as it pivoted toward one of the greatest resources under the new green economy. For example, Chile established itself relatively quickly in the solar photovoltaic (PV) market, especially in the Atacama, which has some of the highest solar radiation on the globe. Since 2023, renewable energy makes up nearly 30% of the total electricity generation in Chile’s mix and the country is looking to leverage the renewable surplus for national growth (such as being an exporter of green hydrogen). Uruguay, a very similar case, has become a very prominent leader in clean energy and uses renewables (primarily wind and hydropower) for over 95% of its electricity. Brazil, a country previously dominated by hydropower, is experiencing an influx of wind and even solar projects that greatly diversify its energy portfolio and attract investments.

The connection between mineral resources and renewable energy presents an opportunity for Latin America to transcend its traditional status as a mere supplier of raw materials in history. Rather than exporting raw minerals, these countries could establish domestic value chains, such as manufacturing battery components, constructing renewable infrastructure, and producing green hydrogen. Argentina has initiated projects to connect lithium extraction with local battery manufacturing to tap upstream higher value-added segments of the industry. Meanwhile, the Chilean government has considered public-private partnerships to encourage lithium production that supports domestic industrialization and environmental criteria.

Furthermore, the current global geopolitical environment favors Latin American mineral-producing countries. As the United States and the European Union look to secure diversified and reliable supplies of critical minerals to reduce dependence on China, Latin American countries can leverage their competitive advantage in bargaining positions. The region could negotiate strategic partnerships, preferential trade agreements, and tech transfer initiatives to secure long-term contracts.

Nevertheless, if Latin America is to take full advantage of the green economy transition, the region will face the challenge of overcoming systemic structural obstacles. The potential is vast, but the challenge is daunting in governance, infrastructure, environmental management, and technological opportunities; the obvious trap of being left with repeated challenges will be difficult to ignore if all that is done is to sustainably extract resources, resulting in temporarily high short-term rents.

In conclusion, the world’s demand for lithium, copper, and renewable resources gives Latin America the unique opportunity to play a critical role in the new green and sustainable energy economy, and by strategically managing the region’s mineral resource base and integrating this into an economic development agenda, the area could turn its natural wealth into long-term prosperity, escaping the resource curse.

However, while the green energy transition presents unique opportunities for Latin America, it also brings risks and challenges that, if not handled with caution, could reproduce patterns of the resource curse that the region traditionally struggles with. Maximizing the potential of the lithium, copper, and renewable energy boom will not only depend on resource extraction but also on mitigating the challenges related to environmental sustainability, social conflict, governance failure, and geopolitical tension.

Environmental sustainability is perhaps the number one challenge; while lithium, copper, and renewable technologies are marketed as green, the extraction of these materials and their production can carry a heavy environmental cost. For example, lithium extraction, particularly in the salt flats of Argentina, Chile, and Bolivia, consumes vast amounts of water in some of the driest regions in the world. In an extreme case, the Salar de Atacama in Chile is one of the largest lithium productions globally but has seen well cited depletion of groundwater and ecological degradation. Equally, copper mining, while more traditional, is an established significant polluter producing copper concentrate. Current production methods initiate deforestation and erosion of soil, resulting in pollution of heavy metals in local aquifers. However, the irony is that while the production of renewable energy technology will be critical in addressing environmental catastrophe, the mining of lithium and copper will only accelerate these processes if not managed differently.

Social tension and conflict will likely erupt in countries where indigenous communities live in or above the critical mineral areas. Miners frequently clash with these groups through land rights and ecological concerns on significant minerals such as lithium and copper. In the mines in Argentina’s lithium plains, indigenous groups are currently protesting mining companies that have been granted mining concessions without local consultation and water resources have been contaminated. In Bolivia, extreme opposition to state-owned lithium production has led to state instability. If the area does not implement strong processes for local engagement, equity sharing, and production standards, social imbalances will continue to grow.

Governance and policymaking guidance continue to remain serious hurdles to the success of lithium, copper, and renewable production in Latin American countries. A clear historical precedent for many Latin American governments onboard is for external firms with significant capital to invest heavily in regional mining but pull-out profit quickly without establishing political accountability or transparency. For example, in Bolivia in recent years, attempts by the Morales administration to take over the lithium sector under state control have all but failed due to inefficiencies and revenue shortfalls, hampering the government’s plans for sustainable energy infrastructure. Chile has seen increasing public pressure to ramp up state functions concerning lithium production while discussing the formation of a new national lithium company to directly extract lithium for state funding. The effective governance of these sectors will ultimately define the regional opportunities.

Overall, while the region is keen to extract and produce lithium to meet global demand, a sustainable future lies in learning from the lessons of the past while integrating resource humanitarian concerns.

Moreover, infrastructure gaps present tangible barriers to harnessing the full potential of the green energy revolution. In many lithium-rich regions, the state of transportation routes, energy distribution systems, and processing plants is inadequate. Extracting raw materials is merely the preliminary phase; without significant investment in downstream processing infrastructure, which includes converting lithium into battery-grade compounds and fabricating cathodes and anodes, these nations risk being tethered to the lower-value segments of the international supply chain. Argentina has begun taking steps to link lithium extraction with battery production; however, major challenges concerning technology transfer, workforce availability, human capital, and financial resources continue to frustrate progress.

Geopolitical factors compound the situation. As global powers compete for preeminence in the supply chains for minerals regarded as of strategic importance, Latin American countries find themselves strategically in a privileged yet precarious position. China has acquired lithium and copper assets across Latin America in both investments and joint ventures at breakneck speed. The United States and the European Union scramble to cement intergovernmental alliances with Latin American countries to mitigate dependence on China in the supply chains. These nations need to deftly navigate these opposing geopolitical currents to figure out how to maximize these competitive advantages without surrendering too much of their political sovereignty in the process of losing their long-term investments in economic development.

Lastly, over-dependence on green commodities could trigger a “green curse.” Lithium and copper prices could exhibit similar patterns to earlier boom-and-bust cycles, with alternative technologies and materials in renewable energy sources being developed in due time. Governments could make the mistake of overlooking diversity and failing to invest in human capital, innovation, or institutional capacity. Without maximizing this current boom, it will merely be another stop along the roller coaster of the Latin American economy.

In conclusion, while Latin America’s ample supplies of critical minerals and renewable energy resources provide a generational opportunity, this promise comes with significant environmental, social, governance, infrastructural, and geopolitical challenges. It will take an “all hands-on deck” approach – from progressive economic development strategies and authentic community engagement to environmental safeguarding measures and investment diversification tailored to maximize upstream potential in manufacturing and value-added services in the mining country’s economy – before this region rises to claim its rightful place in the world economy.

To fully capitalize on the green energy transition and avoid falling prey to yet another iteration of the resource curse, Latin American countries must pursue diverse economic development, governance reform, and regional integration.

First and foremost, countries must progress along the upstream and downstream value chains. Given the abundance of lithium and other critical minerals, a country can extract and process lithium, copper, iron, or other metals, ultimately fostering the manufacture of batteries and installations for renewable energy. Rather than only providing raw materials, these impacted countries should fully define their role in the supply chain.

Governance reform is essential to foster transparency in regulatory frameworks. Internal governance structures can be further strengthened; establishing transparent regulation and firm anti-corruption measures will promote stable economic growth.

Environmental sustainability must become a priority. A nation can enforce regulations and hold corporations accountable for environmental impacts on local communities in regions with abundant critical minerals. Similarly, countries can implement bilateral programs focused on different stakes in the supply chain and region-wide corporations with third nations.

In closing, if Latin American governments prioritize these strategies in the green energy economy, they can simultaneously build the industrial capacity to harness these vital resources and facilitate value-added economic growth, creating a sustainable foundation for broader development and prosperity.

Latin America has an unprecedented opportunity to shift its strategy in managed development, as the world increases its reliance on natural resources and specifically Latin America’s vast potential. But the region’s governments must choose this path very carefully, or they will suffer the ongoing consequences of the same decisions traced back. With the rise in globalization, combined with climate change’s increasing threat, military security concerns, and transitional opportunities becoming more pronounced, all countries will curb biopolitical adaptation on both external and internal policies. It will only take one government taking the bold step of crisis avoidance to bring structural changes to the approach of cooperation or rebound policy, which will stop the flywheel once the first decision is made by the discerning government.

This presents a unique opportunity for Latin America to reframe its existing relationship with resource wealth as the world moves toward renewable energy and electrified consumption. Abundant reserves of critical minerals like lithium or copper and vast potential for renewable energy sources mean these countries can lead the green transition.

However, without emerging from clientist dependency characterized by clientelism and corruption, investing in institutional capacity, promoting governance reform, and moving away from biopolitical dependence on third-party companies are equally important. By realizing this opportunity without a backlash, the Latin American region will lay the groundwork for more sustainable, heterodox growth.

By Qingning Zhao