Let us move on to the final topic of the day: Ratcliffe’s visit to Moscow. Everyone was surprised by John Ratcliffe’s visit because it had not been announced; reports indicate it was a last-minute trip. However, there have since been media reports suggesting that the CIA Director had actually informed other nations a day in advance that he would be going there. We do not know this for certain. What we do know, however, is that this visit effectively served as a substitute for the trip planned by Witkoff and Kushner—Trump’s “shock team,” his official negotiating team. They were supposed to go to Moscow on August 24—Ukraine’s Independence Day—as they had promised. They had not held talks in Russia since January; they had promised to go again at Easter, then said they would go in early summer, then claimed they would go specifically on Ukraine’s Independence Day, yet in the end, they never went at all.

We can therefore infer that Ratcliffe was sent, in a sense, to represent them as well; we can assume it was a highly significant visit, even though Donald Trump described the CIA director’s trip as “semi-routine.” The last visit by a CIA chief to Moscow was Burns’s trip in November 2021—months before the war in Ukraine began—and, as we saw, those details were effectively discussed back then. Clearly, no war starts in the modern world without adversaries being aware or without certain details being discussed beforehand.

Publicly, we were told that he met with Naryshkin at the SVR headquarters and subsequently visited the FSB headquarters to discuss technical matters concerning the war in Ukraine and even the situation regarding Iran. There is no official information available; we rely solely on statements from Russian officials who were questioned by the press about these trips. They were reluctant to provide specifics, merely dismissing rumors that the visit was intended to ask them not to attack NATO states amidst the war effort in Ukraine.

These reports emerged from virtually all major media outlets—including the Wall Street Journal, CBS, and Politico—all stating that the visit’s purpose was to dissuade the Kremlin from taking any military action against other European states. And indeed, that would be the most likely objective of a last-minute trip by Ratcliffe to Moscow. We do not know if that was the case, or if, conversely, the discussion focused more on the conflict involving Iran. After all, that is the most painful issue for them—and the one Donald Trump needs to resolve most urgently. It represents Trump’s most glaring foreign policy failure. The Americans likely wanted to ask the Russians to stop supporting Iran’s war effort. There has been frequent discussion regarding the exchange of military intelligence between Russia and Iran—not to mention technology transfers and the ways they indirectly assist one another. So, these are the two major probable topics.

I believe both matters were indeed discussed, despite the Russians denying it. Evidence confirming that such critical topics—such as a potential expansion of the war in Ukraine—were on the agenda lies in the fact that the Vatican’s Foreign Minister—representing the Vatican’s Secretariat of State—was also in Moscow at the same time. This marks the first time since the war in Ukraine began that such a high-ranking Vatican official has visited Russia and met with Sergey Lavrov, Yuri Ushakov (Putin’s foreign policy advisor), and numerous representatives of the diocese. Furthermore, this visit followed an initial meeting with Ukrainian representatives, so the war in Ukraine and its potential resolution were clearly discussed. Despite its small size, the Vatican wields immense geopolitical power; it possesses not only significant financial resources but also crucial intelligence capabilities and very close ties to the CIA. Thus, we see two separate tracks of engagement: Ratcliffe met with the SVR and FSB—and, according to some of my sources, possibly even Putin, given that the vehicle he was reportedly seen in left the Kremlin prior to his meeting with Naryshkin. Meanwhile, the Vatican representative met with Lavrov and Ushakov—with Lavrov heading up the “other team,” so to speak, within Russia’s leadership.

A second very interesting detail is that Vladimir Putin signed three classified decrees on the day the CIA director visited Moscow. Since they are classified, the content of these decrees is unknown, but the fact that there were three of them—issued in quick succession right after his meeting with Ratcliffe—is highly significant.

A third interesting detail is that, just hours after news of Ratcliffe’s visit became public, Vladimir Putin held a phone call with Ahmed al-Sharaa, the Syrian leader; this could be interpreted as a signal to other international leaders regarding the discussions held concerning the war involving Iran.

Now, admittedly, much of this analysis is speculative due to a lack of sufficient details. I consider it more likely that the discussion focused on an escalation of the war in Ukraine—specifically regarding potential Russian attacks on British military bases—rather than a conventional expansion of the conflict into Romania, Poland, or Moldova. The latter scenario would imply an uncontrolled escalation, whereas an expansion involving only proportional attacks on military infrastructure would be far more controlled and acceptable in terms of international discourse. I certainly do not believe that peace efforts were the subject of discussion at this time.

We see that the idea of ​​peace in Ukraine has been completely abandoned. This leads to the second point, as the Black Sea—and a potential Russian-American understanding regarding it—has likely been a topic of discussion; after all, Turkey is also showing increasing interest in resolving the situation there. Statements from figures in Putin’s inner circle—such as Medvedev, Dugin, and other prominent Russian political commentators—increasingly focus on the idea of ​​stripping Ukraine of all access to the Black Sea during the war’s subsequent phases. Such an operation clearly requires a deal or a specific type of interlocutor with the US, and Ratcliffe is the sort of figure who would be well-suited for such discussions with the Kremlin. In any case, he would be a better choice than Witkoff or Kushner for handling a matter involving so many nuances.

And thirdly, there was a discussion regarding the conflict involving Iran—and, above all, the optics of the situation, even if the Russians might agree, up to a point, to stop directly backing Iran. Nevertheless, that illusion—so to speak—must be maintained. I do not believe any American official expects the Russians to abandon Iran; that clearly will not happen in the coming years. However, there is a significant discussion to be had there, and—perhaps more importantly, in light of the call with Ahmed al-Sharaa—there was talk about the future of Russian bases in Syria. Even if, officially, only joint Russian-Syrian training centers remain, I am certain the conversation also touched upon the Syrian Democratic Forces—specifically the Kurdish community in Syria, which continues to cause considerable trouble. I believe a more complex intervention will be required there, one involving the Russians as well, not just the Israelis, Turks, Syrians, and Americans. So, I think these were the main topics discussed. We could speculate further, but I do not believe there is much point in doing so.

By Daria Gusa

www.solidnews.ro