How will Russia’s takeover of the BRICS+ chairmanship influence world geopolitics?
Photo: Reuters
The BRICS expansion from 5 members (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) to 11 members (BRICS + Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE) come January 1st has made headlines all over the world, with many analysts regarding it as the most important event of the year. Through the expansion of BRICS, China and Russia have increased their influence in the developing world and spread the model of ‘non-interventionism’. The expansion process was precipitated by the sanctions imposed on Russia, which worried even the BRICS+ countries with good relations with the West. In addition, over 40 countries, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Argentina, Algeria, Bolivia, Indonesia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Cuba, Democratic Republic of Congo, Comoros, Gabon, and Kazakhstan have expressed interest in joining the forum, according to the South African president (https://www.reuters.com/world/what-is-brics-who-are-its-members-2023-08-21/). The interest in a BRICS membership was so high that some of the 22 countries that formally applied were shocked by their rejection. For example Nigeria, Africa’s biggest economy and most populous country, wasn’t invited to join despite South African efforts. The explanation is that Russia has great influence within BRICS: Putin rejected Nigeria’s application, as Nigeria is a member of ECOWAS, an organization that is hostile to Russia’s interests, especially regarding the coup in Niger. This analysis will explore the current developments in BRICS, as well as Russia’s role as chair of the organization and potential changes it can implement next year as BRICS chair. While BRICS+ is generally known as a ‘Global South’ alliance, with its member states sharing the view that the West has too much control over the global economy, there are internal disputes within the group that Russia will have to manage. Most notable is the historic border dispute between India and China, escalated to and exemplified by the ‘string of pearls’ and ‘necklace of diamonds’ theories*, India’s boycott of the first Belt and Road forum, India’s ban of Chinese apps, as well as India’s continued membership in the Quad, a diplomatic network committed to stopping China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific, alongside Australia, Japan, and the US. This dispute was most recently emphasized in an internal BRICS discussion: while China and Russia have pushed a quick expansion of BRICS to strengthen their geopolitical influence, India has expressed concern about admitting many new members too quickly. Although the new members all maintain good relations with India, their addition due to China’s lobbying worries India, as with the organization more than doubling India will now have a less valuable vote in an organization dominated by countries with closer ties with China. At the same time, India’s bilateral relationship with the US has become stronger in recent times, with Modi engaging in a significant visit in the US this June and the US seeing India’s partnership as a gateway to containing the growing BRICS threat. Still, India’s collaboration with China within BRICS+ is still viable, viability that can be attributed to Russia’s efforts, thus admitted by India: in a press conference in Moscow from a few days prior, India’s Foreign Minister declared that the friendship between Russia and India is the only constant in international relations, and one that he does not see dissolving any time in the future. Even more important to note is that these declarations come at a time when the euroatlantic world is trying to pull India into a system of political and economic partnerships negotiated through the British PM Rishi Sunak, who is an English citizen of Indian descent and American schooling. Thus, the visibly cold relationship between China and India can be seen as a result of the informal alliance between the former British empire and its former Indian colony.
Another significant internal BRICS+ dispute is the one between Egypt and Ethiopia regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which, if built, would threaten the livelihood of the Egyptian people. Another tense relationship is the Saudi Arabia, UAE and Iran triangle, countries that have been famously involved in a cold war in the Middle East for decades, but it is important to note that Saudi Arabia and Iran have already initiated the process normalizing relations. Yet, the first problem that BRICS+ will have to solve in 2024 is Argentina. Although it formally accepted to join, the country now has a new leadership under newly elected president Javier Milei, who repeatedly expressed his opposition to Argentina joining BRICS. The country has a vast quantity of national resources despite its unstable economy and would be an important ally to BRICS+. A few days ago, the country has declared that it could become a “less active” member of the group, meaning that Milei wants to pull back from Argentina’s relationship with BRICS members Russia, China and Brazil (the latter two currently Argentina’s biggest trading partners), and develop stronger ties with the US and Israel instead (https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/kremlin-notes-argentina-president-elect-mileis-comments-russia-hopes-good-ties-2023-11-20/). These declarations are seen by experts as mere diplomatic tricks preceding a reapproachment to BRICS+. Still, Milei is in a very difficult position, as while BRICS+ is actively pursuing dedollarization, Milei has declared that he shall do the opposite, reforming Argentina’s economy through full deregulation and dollarisation of the Argentinian market. These radical reforms have already been met with mass protests from Argentinians, although not even three weeks have passed from Milei’s takeover of the presidency, as annual inflation has exceeded 160% and the poverty level having surpassed 40% in 2023 (https://www.voanews.com/a/argentines-protest-milei-economic-reforms/7415017.html). Although members of Milei’s party have been categorically negative at the idea of Argentina joining BRICS+, it is important to note that the Argentinian Congress needs to approve any foreign policy decision (such as reversing the BRICS adoration process), and La Libertad Avanza, Milei’s political alliance, only holds a little over 10% of the parliamentary seats (https://buenosairesherald.com/politics/elections/argentina-2023-elections-what-congress-will-look-like-from-december-10). Thus, the question of Argentina remains unclear, to be resolved on the 1st of January.
On another note, although the BRICS+ leaders keep declaring that the BRICS system only has economic aims, one of the founding principles of BRICS was“the shared commitment to restructure the global political, economic, and financial architecture to be fair, balanced and representative, resting on the important pillars of multilateralism and international law”, ie changing the world order from western hegemony to multipolarity. The West’s dominance of international relations over the last centuries has been based on military dominance augmented by superior technology and economy, which is why most of the BRICS initiatives are focused on economy and finance: the establishment of the Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA), the Silk Road Fund, the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB), and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which aim to support member countries facing payment difficulties and to raise additional liquidity for infrastructure development worldwide, including technological infrastructure, at a global scale, as well as the subsequent process of dedollarization take pressure off all of the individual economies within BRICS, easing the effect of sanctions or changes in the US economy, and thus enhancing economic autonomy. Russia is no longer a part of G7 (or G8 as it was called back then), which is seen as the most powerful state grouping in the world, and it is unlikely that it would want to join again, since BRICS+ has just overtaken the G7 not only in terms of population, but also in terms of GDP. BRICS+ has thus become the new multipolar center of power, showing the triumph of humanity over transhumanism through Russia’s “order based on justice” policy that brings together countries that value traditional values as the foundation of their identities. In a news conference that lasted more than 4 hours, President Vladimir Putin criticized the West for demanding a so-called „rules-based world order” and said that the next BRICS+ summit under Russia’s presidency in 2024 will be dedicated to establishing a „fair” world order, declaring that the so-called “rules-based world order” does not actually exist because the rules change every day depending on the political agenda and the interests of those promoting the prevailing narrative, and that the BRICS summit will demonstrate that there are enough powerful countries in the world who do not want to live by those unwritten rules imposed by the Americans based on their own interest, but rather by the rules enshrined in fundamental documents like the UN Charter. From an organizational point of view, Putin mentioned that Russia’s work under its BRICS presidency will be dedicated to a „fair world order,” with about 200 political, economic and social events in the works for 2024 (http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/72994).
It is useful to mention that BRICS+ runs on a rotating chairmanship, with Brazil initially meant chair in 2024. But, because Brazil is already chairing the G20 this year, an arrangement extremely favorable to BRICS+ has emerged, with Russia taking over the chairmanship a year earlier, thus coordinating with Brazil who is chairing the G20, the parallel organization. It is obvious that this is a great geopolitical victory against the West, with China’s quiet satisfaction palpable. In addition, it is important to note that Putin is finishing 2023, a year crucial to his position, in a cloud of glory, having completely invalidated Western expectations of his political isolation and Russian economic ruin as a result of sanctions! Putin managed to not only meet with almost every important non-Western leader in the past year, but also record a 5.5% economic growth (https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/russias-q3-gdp-growth-confirmed-55-rosstat-2023-12-13/). In addition to the BRICS+ chairmanship, Russia shall also be chairing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 2024, an organization that it founded following the dissolution of the Soviet Union that encompasses all former Soviet states except for Ukraine, and recently, Moldova. In addition, to properly emphasize Russia’s role on the world stage, it is important to note that in July 2024, Hungary, which is commonly seen as Russia’s proxy in Europe, will also take over the rotating presidency of an important organization, namely the EU Council. We now have the full perspective of the big geopolitical games that Russia and its allies have in store for 2024 and, given the show of force that “Putin, Xi and Company” have made at the international political and economic level in 2023, it is to be expected that things will continue to flow in their favor.
To come back to BRICS+ and Russia, which can be seen as the founder of BRICS, having held the first ministerial meeting of BRIC countries in 2006 and subsequently hosted the bloc’s first summit in 2009, demonstrating to the West that it has other important trading and political partners. While the last time that Russia held the BRICS presidency, in 2020, its objectives were vague, focused on general cooperation between BRICS countries, its goals today are more tangible. Firstly, note that on the 1st of January, Russia will take over the chairmanship of the newly extended BRICS+ under the theme “Strengthening multilateralism for equitable global development and security”. Secondly, note that in Putin’s speech at the Johannesburg summit this summer (which he joined remotely due to the ICC arrest warrant on his name), Putin declared the establishment of a permanent BRICS+ transport commission that would develop global transport corridors during Russia’s chairmanship, as well as expanding trade, interbank cooperation and the use of national currencies between BRICS+ countries. Putin’s pragmatic approach comes as a direct response to the accusations that BRICS has been ‘all talk, no action’, so it is obvious that Russia will want to make some tangible efforts which bring palpable and successful results, especially at this time of increased global attention. I have researched some possible directions that Russia’s actions will take, which I summarize below:
Predictable strategies of Russia’s chairmanship
Developing energy trade in a sustainable fashion. Considering that the BRICS+ countries now make up 43% of global crude oil production (more than OPEC), this would send a clear signal to the West that BRICS+ is willing to play by the rules that other international organizations have set in promoting an agenda that truly has global benefits. A full-scale conceptualization of the upcoming energy transition for non-western countries is to be expected, especially considering the BRICS Energy Research Platform launched at the initiative of Russia.
Implementing the optional study of Chinese and other BRICS+ languages in Russian schools as well as the promotion of the Russian language in the other BRICS+ countries as an alternative to the dominance of Western languages.
The launch of a new payment instrument to counter the SWIFT system and to allow member countries to pursue their aim of dedollarization. Instead of relying on gold reserves like the initial Bretton Woods dollarisation relied on, which favored Western economies, the BRICS+ countries could consider standardizing the system and backing it on natural reserves to ensure its stability.
As technology is one of the pillars of the West’s dominance, BRICS+ countries could engage in the creation of joint R&D projects and research centers, as well as an overall exchange of technologies.
Continuing the process of transport interconnectedness and infrastructure for trade, such as the famous Chinese Belt and Road initiative.
Regarding education, Russia will most likely act on the need to create a BRICS+ university ranking not controlled by the West, as discussed in Johannesburg. In addition to this, BRICS+ could also develop joint study programs for students and academics within BRICS+ countries, strengthening the cultural cohesion between them.
Establishing a new and fair international legal framework to counter the sanctions imposed by the West (less probable in 2024, but certainly predictable in the future).
In addition to these strategies, there will certainly be other strategies in the works, strategies which cannot be publicly declared. Considering the military war in Ukraine, which is actually between the US and Russia, and the war between US and China, regarding Taiwan, it is predictable that the decisions that BRICS+ will take next year (at Russia’s behest, but with China’s “no limit” support) will challenge the US hegemony and create additional economic and financial difficulties for the Americans, who are already visibly facing a number of crises which will escalate in the difficult election year ahead. The collective West should thus be stable enough and prepared enough to counter all of these economic obstacles that Russia/China/BRICS+ will put in its way, something that it has not achieved in 2023, and I doubt that it will achieve in 2024.
The ‘string of pearls’ theory refers to the process that China is undertaking ofencircling India through building civilian maritime infrastructure along the Indian Ocean. In response, India is engaging in a ‘necklace of diamonds’ strategy, expanding its naval bases and establishing very strong relationships with all of China’s neighbours.
By Daria Gusa
