The Americans were not mentioned even once as the perpetrators of the attacks; instead, the conversation focused heavily on the war between Russia and Ukraine and on Russia’s aggression. This occurred at an event where, logically, one might have expected the Japanese to distance themselves somewhat from the US—rather than Russia—given that it was not the Russians who bombed them. Another factor is China’s increasingly intense focus on Taiwan.

We see Xi Jinping exerting pressure on Japan, and any pressure applied to Japan from the north—that is, by the Russians—aids Xi Jinping and underscores the “no-limits” friendship between Russia and China. So, these are some of the events at play. Japan currently appears to be in a very weakened position, especially given that this week—just days later—the United States sanctioned the President of the International Criminal Court, Tomoko Akane, a Japanese judge.

There is no need to rehash the ongoing debates regarding the International Criminal Court and what I consider the Americans’ embarrassing efforts to defy international law even more openly at a time when they are no longer the hegemon. But yes, that is a separate discussion. Furthermore, the Japanese failed to properly condemn this American action.

While European states—and the European Union representation in particular—condemned the actions taken by Donald Trump and Marco Rubio in this regard, Sanae Takaichi merely described the sanctions against this high-ranking ICC official (sanctions severe enough to completely bar her from using the US financial system—which effectively serves as the international system) as “very unfortunate.” These are serious sanctions, yet Sanae Takaichi, a Japanese leader, simply remarked that they were “very unfortunate” and stated that Japan would continue to communicate with the relevant countries.

The Japanese Foreign Minister used rather neutral language, stopping short of condemning the US actions and stating only that they remain committed to upholding the rule of law within the international community. The fact that they did not even call for a reversal of Washington’s decision—especially considering the individual involved is a Japanese national, and a highly renowned and internationally respected one at that—places Japan in a position of significant weakness. It serves as a reminder that Japan relies almost exclusively on the US for a foreign policy that is otherwise quite hostile toward its neighbors—and this at a time when the US is gradually disengaging from East Asia.

If we look at the crisis facing the US military—and it is indeed a crisis—the US is severely overstretched, with too many active fronts requiring its support. The first front to be abandoned is East Asia. The aircraft carrier “George Washington” transited the Strait of Malacca and headed into the Indian Ocean to relieve the “Lincoln”—which we discussed last week—allowing the *Lincoln’s* crew to finally return home after nearly a year at sea.

The US currently has no major aircraft carrier in the Pacific or East Asia. The fact that this is unprecedented in recent decades—occurring amidst increasingly aggressive rhetoric between Japan and China—leaves America’s key East Asian allies (South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan) effectively exposed by this decision. And I have just mentioned South Korea. In this context, we see the Americans gradually withdrawing, and once again, the extent to which these nations—including Japan and South Korea—are actually weakened without American assistance is highlighted. Donald Trump ordered the Pentagon to scale back joint military exercises with South Korea, partly in response to South Korea’s refusal to support the U.S. in the Middle East conflict, and partly as a positive gesture to strengthen ties with Kim Jong-un. After all, Donald Trump has always liked Kim Jong-un; they have even claimed to be friends.

I assume you have already seen Donald Trump’s full post, so I won’t read the whole thing. Trump’s favorable attitude toward Kim Jong-un in this post came as something of a surprise, given that just a month ago he had cited North Korea—alongside Russia, China, and Iran—as a US adversary capable of manipulating American elections. Consequently, no one expected Trump to suddenly recall North Korea in a positive light.

However, what we are actually seeing here is another instance of withdrawal from East Asia, even though American analysts have tried to cast Trump’s actions in a positive light. They interpreted his moves as an attempt to break the Russia-North Korea-China axis—given North Korea’s close ties to China and Russia, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine. They argued that Trump is trying to befriend Kim Jong-un to weaken the latter’s ties with Russia and China. I, however, believe the exact opposite.

I stand by the view I expressed a year—or nearly a year and a half—ago: that this is essentially about an understanding between Donald Trump, Xi Jinping, and Vladimir Putin to divide the world into spheres of influence. Donald Trump will have to withdraw US forces from areas where they are no longer welcome from the Russian and Chinese perspective. The US will essentially retain hegemony in the Western Hemisphere—in Latin America—but its influence and presence in the rest of the world will be limited. This is only natural, as the US military’s expansion into so many corners of the globe is not the norm.

As proof of this, alongside the withdrawal from East Asia and the issue regarding military exercises—which Hegseth justified as a cost-cutting measure—the US is simultaneously strengthening its military cooperation with South America. Recently, SOUTHCOM (the US Southern Command) has made increasing efforts to integrate US military forces into local security structures, including the approval of joint operations with Honduras, Colombia, and Guatemala. We thus clearly see this division, which leaves South Korea and Japan extremely vulnerable.

Further evidence of this is the recent visit to Seoul, South Korea, by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi—who was there just yesterday and today. During his visit, he urged the South Koreans to choose strategic autonomy rather than siding with the US. They were clearly prepared to capitalize on the opportunities created by Trump’s move. Wang Yi has a busy schedule; he does not make such visits on the spur of the moment. It is evident that the Chinese were aware of this surprise US announcement and are ready to gain even greater influence in the Eastern Hemisphere—their own sphere of the world.

That is all for today, dear listeners. You can see how we constantly return to the concept of a return to spheres of influence—an idea I explained at length in my book, *The Geopolitical Power Barometer and the New World Order*, published late last year.

By Daria Gusa

www.solidnews.ro