This is where internal fractures come into play. With a population of approximately 50 million, South Korea has the world’s lowest birth rate, a rapidly shrinking workforce, and a pension system under immense strain. Economically, while it boasts the world’s tenth-largest economy by GDP, the *chaebol* model concentrates power within a few conglomerates, and young people face unaffordable housing prices and a polarized labor market. Socially, gender tensions run high, and the suicide rate remains among the highest in the OECD. Politically, the country has weathered a major institutional crisis—Yoon Suk-yeol’s declaration of martial law in December 2024 and his subsequent removal from office left the system polarized between conservatives and progressives. On the international stage, Korea is caught in the middle: the US-China rivalry over chips, Pyongyang’s growing closeness to Moscow, and direct exposure to any potential crisis in the Taiwan Strait.

However, there are areas where Seoul is already demonstrating its ambition to play a larger geopolitical role. The cultural sector—spanning everything from K-dramas to K-pop—is the most visible example of this “soft power.” The government invests billions of dollars in it annually. Consequently, as of 2022, the Korean groups BTS and Blackpink rank as the world’s most influential and successful bands by most metrics; *Squid Game* stands as the most successful series ever released by Netflix; and *Parasite* became the first foreign-language film in history to win the Academy Award for Best Picture.

It is against this backdrop that President Lee Jae-myung’s speech at the UN this week must be viewed. Lee positioned himself as a peacemaker for the peninsula, proposing a three-part vision for peaceful coexistence with Pyongyang: mutual respect, restored communication channels, and broader cooperation, alongside a stated path toward gradual denuclearization. Lee describes Trump’s overture to Kim Jong-un as a “window of opportunity” and embraces the role of facilitator, aware that any peace treaty would grant him strategic independence. The benefits of a peace policy toward North Korea are, first and foremost, domestic: Lee gains room to maneuver with his own progressive base, defuses an issue that has poisoned Korean politics for seven decades, and—theoretically—paves the way for resuming inter-Korean economic projects. Without clear guarantees involving the US and China or the US and Russia, however, Lee risks merely repeating the failures of past agreements.

The second element—less discussed in the media but central—is the “K-Initiative,” which rests on three pillars: expanding global access to the benefits of artificial intelligence, accelerating the green transition, and strengthening cooperation to secure global energy supply chains. Under this final pillar, Lee proposed a “Coalition of Constructive Contributors,” a cooperation framework designed to restore confidence in multilateralism beyond rigid geopolitical blocs. Korea also announced its support for reforming the UN and the Security Council. In effect, Lee’s speech aligned with the core values ​​and proposals of the BRICS nations—particularly Beijing—without the need to openly declare a shift away from the US. Let us not forget that just last week, Lee moved to dispatch warships to secure the passage of oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz, defying Trump’s public demand. This ambition suits Seoul perfectly and signals a deeper reorientation, moving away from the excessive pragmatism the US displays in its dealings with both partners and adversaries.

A complete distancing from the US is obviously unrealistic in the short and medium term—USFK, the nuclear umbrella, operational control, and technological dependence make a structural rupture impossible without incurring a security cost that no administration in Seoul could shoulder. What is realistic is functional diversification: deepening economic ties with China, resuming informal channels with Russia regarding the North Korean issue (Moscow now holds direct influence over Pyongyang and cannot be bypassed in any genuine negotiation), and seeking out other middle powers (the Gulf, India, ASEAN) through a coalition conceived as a network rather than a bloc. However, this network can never bypass China, and China requires a relative American withdrawal from the region. Under this logic, the US would remain present for a potential conflict without constantly stoking tensions. Washington is willing to reduce its military footprint in the area to this end—a point I analyzed in the context of Putin’s visit to the Kuril Islands last month (*Geopolitica la Zi* (87): Putin’s visit to the Kurils and the reduction of US military exercises with South Korea signal East Asia’s return to the Chinese sphere of influence – Solid News). On a rhetorical level, Beijing’s calls for South Korea to choose strategic autonomy over dependence on the US align with Lee’s harsh stance toward Israel: he has labeled Benjamin Netanyahu a “war criminal” and compared the actions of the Israeli military to those of the Nazis. Once again, Lee has opted for rhetorical alignment with BRICS rather than Washington. It will be interesting to see how Seoul builds these parallel cooperation networks, a process that would also entail distancing itself from the US. If it succeeds in maintaining its relationship with Washington while strengthening ties with Beijing, Korea will become the first real-world case study of a middle power breaking free from bloc-based logic without losing its primary ally—thereby validating the hypothesis I put forward last year regarding the division of the world into spheres of influence among Trump, Xi, and Putin.

By Daria Gusa

www.solidnews.ro