The U.S.-Russia Partnership Has Been Made Concrete Through the Trump-Putin Fuel Deal. Where does that leave Romania?

Last night, what has already become a widely discussed phone call took place between Donald Trump and Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. It may have seemed somewhat sudden, but rest assured that it had been extremely well prepared in advance by people close to both leaders. What was the result, as presented today by Putin? I will quote Donald Trump, who said the following: “I have just concluded an extremely productive conversation with the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, during which it was agreed that Russia will immediately supply diesel fuel to the American and global markets. Moscow will begin fuel deliveries to the United States immediately, and the agreed timetable provides for an initial shipment of 300,000 tons of diesel, to be supplied at once, followed by another 500,000 tons in November and a further one million tons shortly thereafter. Russia will subsequently deliver an additional tranche of three million tons of fuel. Between our total control over the Strait of Hormuz and this important announcement regarding Russian energy, diesel prices for Americans and, in fact, for the entire world will rapidly fall to record-low levels.” That is the essence of it.

In numerical terms, these five million tons of diesel destined for the American market alone represent roughly $7.5 billion and a major commercial outlet for Russia in the United States. The consequences and prospects, however, are far broader and more complex. The major objective Putin achieved through this conversation is, in effect, the halting of commercial sanctions against Russian companies and, above all, the reopening of the global market to Russia, because from this point onward Russia will be able to supply fuel to other markets as well. This means many things, but first and foremost it means that all the fanatical and relatively useless sanctions imposed on Russia by the self-styled wise men of the European Union are, in turn, becoming obsolete and, as I have said, pointless. The Putin regime is thus being given a substantial breath of fresh air, while all those EU leaders who have grown accustomed to aligning themselves with Zelensky and his entourage in the context of the war in Ukraine will increasingly look ridiculous.

In geopolitical terms, to put it very simply, it is clear that this Trump-Putin agreement effectively gives concrete form to a new U.S.-Russia strategic partnership. This arrangement and this partnership serve both sides very well. The United States obtains a solution to the public pressure caused by high fuel prices, something Americans are notoriously unwilling to tolerate. And yes, this also helps Trump in the midterm elections. A friend in need is a friend indeed: Putin is helping Trump. At the same time, however, he is giving Trump the opportunity to move alongside the Russia-China tandem in various initiatives with an energy dimension, but above all with a complex geoeconomic dimension. We are, after all, talking about a Trump who is a businessman and who understands precisely what he has achieved for Russia by reopening large-scale energy trade. So make no mistake: the geoeconomic shift that took place last night, so to speak, is profound and completely changes the paradigm of global geoeconomic relations. In practical terms, international relations will begin to reorient themselves from today onward.

The Washington-Moscow axis therefore becomes the most relevant one at present for the countries of the collective West. Only fools fail to understand that, while the naive who hope they can pivot toward China through bilateral arrangements designed to bypass Russia or America can forget about it. The Beijing-Moscow partnership, yes, the “no limits” partnership, according to the definitions offered by both the Chinese and the Russians, is functioning without difficulty. This complex and comprehensive partnership will ensure that any third-party arrangements entered into by the Putin and Xi governments will disadvantage neither Russia nor China. Much will be written and analyzed about the strategic move made by Putin and Trump. I will, of course, return to the subject myself.

For now, however, I want to speak briefly about Romania’s situation, which is desperate from a geopolitical standpoint. If we take the war in Ukraine into account, you should be convinced that we are the first country that could be forced to jump into the fire of this conflict. Poland comes after Romania in the order of exposure, and there are several reasons for that. One of them is the Black Sea, although the Poles, in any case, know how to defend their national interest and have demonstrated this repeatedly throughout history. So we are standing directly in front of the fire. In what condition? Our military defense is a joke, while there is hardly any point in even discussing the offensive capability of our armed forces. We have relied, we rely, and we will continue to rely strictly on the United States. And these stories about NATO taking care of us in times of need and trouble are bedtime stories for deaf English children. Any serious analyst, regardless of geopolitical orientation, will tell you today that if a war between the EU and Russia begins, it will begin from Romania.

So what are we supposed to do under the conditions created by this newly concrete partnership between Russia and the United States? Do we enter a war against Russia on Ukraine’s side and then expect Trump to help us if the Russians attack us? We cannot realistically hope for that. Who would defend us then? The Germans do not possess adequate military capabilities, and I can already picture them, as they have done many times throughout history, soon lining up in Moscow to resume energy trade with Russia. France is far away, weakened, and for those who understand the situation it is increasingly clear that Paris too wants to repair its relationship with Moscow. Britain? Its special forces have been secretly deployed on the Ukrainian front since the beginning of the war, and it cannot make additional special forces available. It simply does not possess the capacity to sustain several fronts simultaneously.

But in reality there is only one fundamental truth. I can list Romania’s so-called Western partners here as much as I like. Only America, my friends, can defend Romania if such a situation were ever to arise. This logically and necessarily creates, particularly for Romania, a political obligation toward its citizens: our politicians must find solutions capable of keeping us safe. That is, of course, if we do not want to become the devastated country that Ukraine unfortunately is today.

What can we do? We must think about and test ways of making ourselves useful along this new Washington-Moscow axis, in the hope that, as the geopolitical situation evolves in the predictable direction, we may eventually be able to position ourselves along that axis as well. As I said at the beginning, are there other solutions available to us in our desperate situation? Perhaps there are, but I do not see them, and I have been thinking about this direction and this subject for many decades.

I go back 24 years, to the moment when George W. Bush, during a visit to Bucharest, indicated the path Romania should follow under the geopolitical conditions of that time, which were far calmer than those of today. “You should be a bridge between the United States and Russia. That is what America needs from Romania.” That was essentially what the president of the United States said while visiting Bucharest. I know the details very well, including how the speech was prepared, why it was prepared in that way, and how the idea subsequently disappeared from the agenda, because a friend of mine from the Atlantic Council at that time, Damon Wilson, was Bush Junior’s principal adviser during the Bucharest visit. Damon himself helped prepare the speech to the Romanian people that the American president delivered in Bucharest’s Senate Square. We did not act on it then. Adrian Năstase was the one in charge, and he squandered a geopolitically valuable indication. He said he did not understand what George Bush had meant. I will not dwell on that now.

Then, roughly three years later, around 2005, Traian Băsescu and I clashed over this very subject. I, of course, had already been labeled a Putinist since 2002, courtesy of Adrian Năstase. Even back then, I wanted to build a strategic partnership axis with Russia, because the importance of a Bucharest-Washington-Moscow axis was already clear. The Black Sea had the potential to fall under Russian control even then, something Băsescu himself acknowledged. But beyond that, the project of reunification with Moldova was also important to me, and I had discussed it informally at the time both with leaders of the Republic of Moldova and with advisers to Putin. Let me remind you that I was the secretary-general of the governing party, and naturally I was also taking Romania’s protection into account in the event of conflict. Our military was still far stronger then than it is today, but even so, we could not afford to become the victims of a conflict because we would have been destroyed. Băsescu, by contrast, having already fallen under the influence of George Soros’s team, insisted, foolishly, I might add, although he is by no means a fool, on a geopolitical axis that was impossible from the outset: Bucharest-London-Washington.

Today, returning to the present, the fundamentals have not changed. What has changed is that the surrounding context has deteriorated and become more radicalized. Is the Black Sea today predominantly a Russian lake? Yes. Is the reunification of Romania and Moldova once again on the agenda and visible on the horizon? Yes. Can such a reunification take place without an agreement between Russia and the United States? No, absolutely not. In the event of conflict, can anyone other than the United States defend us? No. Is there any reason for us to continue maintaining a diplomatic conflict with Russia? Absolutely none. And not only because we could find ourselves in imminent danger of losing our country, which is the negative dimension of the situation, but also because, on the contrary, we could gain a great deal from a geoeconomic perspective. My conclusion is simple: I am waiting to be challenged with arguments by other established geopolitical analysts. I am genuinely curious to hear their reasoning.

What we are talking about today is a geopolitical window of opportunity of the kind a country rarely receives in its history. When Romania became Greater Romania and achieved its national unification, it did so precisely by taking advantage of such a window of opportunity, with significant external assistance. In circumstances like these, one has to act decisively, because otherwise the train leaves the station and you are left standing on the platform. I will elaborate further on this soon, because it is necessary.

And finally, I want to reiterate something for which I was accused by the so-called pro-Europeans six months ago, when I made the same point. I will repeat it: yes, I publicly advocate finding a Romanian solution for an organized diplomatic coexistence with Russia, because the Russian Empire is not going anywhere. Russia’s power will grow, with or without Putin. And yes, the optimal option for Romania would be a strategic partnership with Russia, perhaps initiated through the shared bond of Orthodox Christianity.

By Cozmin Gusa